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This paper develops an analytical framework that can be used to anticipate problems in 
the banking system and enable supervisors to take mitigating actions at an early stage.  
 
This paper has two components. First, it develops an early warning indicator that is 
intended to capture a number of the systemic risks that can affect the banking system as 
a whole. Second, it develops a methodology to detect problems at the individual bank 
level in an effort to identify those firms with financial vulnerabilities.  
 
For the systemic component of our methodology, the final output is a banking system 
vulnerability index to facilitate bank monitoring tasks, as well as some disaggregated 
subcomponents that are intended to display the relative importance of the different risks 
(e.g., liquidity, currency, and interest rate risks). Regarding the assessment of the 
soundness of individual institutions, the paper uses a methodology based on cluster 
analysis that incorporates the results of the previous framework. 
 
There is an empirical application of the systemic component that is based on the 
2001 Argentine banking crisis. It shows that the proposed vulnerability indicator started 
to increase steadily beginning in 1999, following 2 years in which it had remained flat, 
and it finally peaked in mid-2001, which was just before the onset of the crisis.  
 
 
Keywords:  Banks, stress testing, banking crises, banking regulation, banking 
supervision, early warning systems 
 

























This paper develops a methodological framework to help bank supervisors anticipate 
eventual problems and take mitigating actions at an early stage.  
 
We develop a proposal applicable to banking systems as a whole in order to support 
systemic monitoring. In addition, we propose a particular methodology for the early 
detection of problems facing individual entities in order to facilitate preventive actions 
and avoid eventual contagion risks. 
 
As opposed to the traditional early warning indicators approach (à la Kaminsky), which 
relies on econometric modeling and historical data, our methodology makes use of 
stress-testing practices such as those recently used to analyze the soundness of banks 
in industrialized countries, which rely on projected macroeconomic and financial 
scenarios.  
 
In regard to the systemic part of our methodological proposal, the final output is an 
overall banking vulnerability index to facilitate bank monitoring tasks, as well as some 
disaggregated subcomponents that are intended to display the relative importance of the 
different risks (e.g., liquidity, currency, and interest rate risks) in the composition of the 
overall vulnerability index. 
 
The vulnerability index is calculated as follows: (i) develop a set of macroeconomic and 
financial scenarios, either by judgmental opinion or by simulation techniques, and project 
some key variables such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth, interest rates, and 
exchange rates, among others; (ii) simulate over a 12-quarter period of the banking 
system’s balance sheet and income statement under the projected macro-financial 
scenarios developed in the first step; (iii) trace the evolution of the risk indicators (e.g., 
liquidity ratios and capital adequacy ratios) over the simulation period under the 
projected scenarios; (iv) select the appropriate thresholds in order to separate the 
normal values that each indicator can take from the “problem zone,” which is a range of 
values that indicate some type of vulnerability in the system; and (v) determine the 
number of risk indicators that would be in the problem zone at any point in time during 
the simulation period and the size of the distance from their thresholds, and summarize 
all of this information into a single vulnerability indicator.  
 
In addition, by determining the risk indicators that enter into the problem zone and to 
what extent, the methodology provides a detailed picture of the eventual behavior of the 
vulnerability index subcomponents, which helps to identify where banking weaknesses 
may lie and favors adequate mitigating actions. 
 
Regarding the assessment of an individual entity’s soundness, the paper proposes a 
type of cluster analysis methodology in combination with the previous framework. In this 
case, the methodology can be summarized as follows: (i) develop a set of 
macroeconomic and financial scenarios, either by judgmental opinion or by simulation 
techniques, and project some key variables (e.g., GDP growth, interest rates, exchange 
rates); (ii) simulate over a 12-quarter period of each bank’s balance sheet and income  
 
statement under the projected macro-financial scenarios developed in the first step; (iii) 
trace the evolution of the risk indicators (e.g., liquidity ratios and capital adequacy ratios) 
of each bank over the simulation period under the projected scenarios; (iv) measure the 
distance of each bank’s projected risk indicators from those of their group of peers; (v) 
find those banks that are far enough from their peers in terms of their projected risk 
indicators to be considered outliers (by selecting a threshold based, for example, on the 
empirical distribution of distance measures); (vi) assess which of the risk indicators 
account for most of the calculated distances in order to identify the outlier institutions 
and the type of risks that makes them more vulnerable than their peers, and provide 
guidance on the corrective actions that need to be taken. 
 
It is worth noting that our methodology to analyze systemic vulnerabilities and the 
methodology proposed for the evaluation of individual institutions are both based on 
forward-looking exercises. Therefore, all of the indicators that result from them can be 
viewed as early warning indicators. As mentioned above, these early warning indicators 
are different from typical indicators based on historical data, which have proven to be not 
as useful or applicable as desired due to data availability constraints, among other 
problems. 
 
While our methodology has the advantage of not depending on data availability and 
econometric modeling, it relies on the ability of the supervisor to envision relevant 
macroeconomic scenarios under a judgmental setting and the supervisor’s proficiency in 
selecting adequate probability distributions and calibrating appropriate parameters under 
a simulation framework. 
 
An illustrative application was made for the case of Argentine private banks, showing 
that our vulnerability indicator started to increase steadily beginning in 1999, following 
2 years of flat behavior, and peaked in 2001, which was just before the onset of the 
crisis. At the same time, the counterfactual assessment of the subcomponents shows a 
good early diagnosis of the vulnerability sources that eventually disrupted the Argentine 

















   




The recent banking crisis in the industrialized countries has stirred debate about its 
causes, consequences, and policy implications. The extent and depth of this crisis took 
economists and policymakers by surprise. The policy response was decisive and 
unprecedentedly large, and while the consequences of the crisis are still not totally clear, 
everything indicates that it has had large fiscal costs and led to the worst worldwide 
recession since the Great Depression. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, this crisis took place in spite of increased efforts in recent 
years by policymakers to strengthen financial stability and at a time when regulators 
were putting in place the Basel II principles to reduce financial vulnerability and 
strengthen the banking sector. 
 
Financial crises, by their nature, may be unavoidable and we are likely to experience 
others in the future that could very well be the consequence of financial innovations, new 
excesses in financial markets, or some other unforeseen event. The implementation of 
adequate policies and a better understanding of crises’ possible causes and 
transmission mechanisms can certainly help to limit the detrimental effects when they do 
occur. 
 
Although policymakers failed to anticipate the recent crisis, the decisive response, which 
to a large extent was devised from in-depth studies of the policy mistakes that were 
made during the Great Depression, has so far helped to limit the adverse economic and 
financial outcomes. 
 
A distinctive feature of this crisis is that by and large it did not spread to banking systems 
in emerging market countries (EMCs). Although it may still be too early to arrive at a firm 
conclusion, it seems that there are at least three reasons that can explain this outcome. 
First, the crisis mainly affected investment banks and institutions that were involved with 
derivates and complex structured products, which are not as prevalent in EMCs. 
Second, there has been significant improvement in the quality of the prudential 
regulation of banks in EMCs in recent years. Furthermore, banks in these countries 
entered this crisis well-capitalized and were not as vulnerable as they had previously 
been in terms of currency and interest rate gaps. Third, EMCs had much better 
macroeconomic fundamentals than during previous crisis episodes, with stronger fiscal 
and external accounts, a larger stock of international reserves, and more flexible 
exchange rate systems. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a set of indicators and a vulnerability index to 
help detect in advance macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities that can affect the 
banking system. The paper follows a top–down approach by starting with a review of the 
macroeconomic variables generally recognized in the economic literature as key to 
alerting policymakers of potential financial problems and discusses how to include them 
in our analysis. In section 2 we will discuss the transmission mechanisms of 
macroeconomic variables that impact the banking sector and identify the main variables 
needed to be tracked based on their ability to affect the performance of the banking 
system and impact the banks’ balance sheets.  
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Section 3 concentrates on those issues that could lead to systemic problems in the 
banking system. Among other aspects, the section evaluates the effectiveness of the 
financial safety net, which includes issues such as the scope and viability of the deposit 
insurance system, the existence of a lender of last resort, as well as potential risks 
deriving from large exposures to the public sector or from the liquidity side. It also 
analyzes the interactions between banking and macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Section 4 develops a detailed methodology for the construction of a banking vulnerability 
index based on the main items of the balance sheet and profit and loss statements, 
which is then used to evaluate the banking system’s ability to withstand different types of 
shocks such as a currency depreciation or a sharp increase in interest rates, among 
others. The methodology used in this paper combines the more traditional approach of 
early warning indicators with some element of stress testing that have been used 
recently to analyze the soundness of banks in the industrialized countries. A distinctive 
feature of this approach is that it introduces stress testing to construct early warning 
indicators of banking system problems, which is done by constructing different 
macroeconomic and financial scenarios and tracing their effects over time on key 
banking performance indicators.  
 
Section 5 develops an application to show how our methodology would have worked in 
the case of the 2001 Argentine banking crisis. The application shows that the 
methodology can potentially be very useful in monitoring the evolution of a banking 
system and detecting vulnerabilities at an early stage.  
 
At the same time, it is worth noting that the exercise shows that there are important 
requirements in terms of data and in having a thorough understanding of the main 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities, and the characteristics of the banking 
system. The models are country specific and need to incorporate an individual country’s 
macro, financial, and institutional characteristics in some detail.  
 
The main objective of Section 6 is to look at the evolution of risk indicators of individual 
banks under alternative macro scenarios in order to detect at an early stage whether 
there are financial institutions potentially at risk. We propose a methodology that is 
based on peer group analysis that reviews a pre-set number of bank indicators to 
monitor the performance of individual banks and detect which are the outliers within the 
system.  
 
In section 7 we present the main findings of the paper and some preliminary conclusions 
about the usefulness of the methodology and the challenges and data requirements of 
applying it to different countries. 
 
 
2.   Macroeconomic Factors and Systemic Banking Risks 
 
The recent international financial crisis, which had its epicenter in the industrialized 
countries, has generated a new debate about the causes and consequences of financial 
crises. One critical question that has been raised time and again is why regulators and 
monitoring institutions did not foresee that a crisis of this type was coming and why they  
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took no early action to avoid it. How did regulators not perceive the problems with 
collateralized debt obligations or with credit default swaps?  
 
This financial crisis was the result of a combination of adverse events including (i) a lack 
of regulation of key financial players such as investment banks and insurance 
companies; (ii) a lack of coordination among the regulatory agencies within and across 
countries in monitoring globalized complex financial institutions; and (iii) the inability of 
credit rating agencies to understand complex structured products, which led them to 
consistently underestimate risks in awarding generous investment grade rates ratings. 
 
While the causes of the recent international financial crisis, especially in the 
industrialized countries, are not yet entirely clear, they appear to be more related to 
excesses and a lack of supervision in the financial markets, and less related to 
macroeconomic policies and imbalances. One could argue that a relatively long period of 
low interest rates and large increases in asset prices were important factors, but the 
main problems appear to be excesses in the financial sector and very lenient lending 
policies. 
 
In this respect, the recent financial crisis seems different from the typical crisis in EMCs 
that have mainly been triggered by macroeconomic events, including sudden and large 
changes in key macroeconomic prices (e.g., a sharp currency depreciation, inflation, and 
a sudden stop in capital inflows), or significant and unexpected increases in long-term 
domestic interest rates. 
 
The recent banking crises in EMCs—Mexico in 1994/95, Asia in 1997/98, Russia in 
1998, and Argentina and Uruguay in 2001/02—all had their origins in macroeconomic 
imbalances that directly affected the solvency or liquidity of banking systems. In some 
cases the problem was a maxi-devaluation that had a large balance sheet effect, as 
banks were net debtors in dollars (Asia). In other cases, fiscal and debt management 
problems affected banks that had a large exposure to the public sector (Russia). Finally, 
in a third group of countries, expectations of a devaluation combined with a government 
that faced solvency problems and had no access to financing triggered a run on a 
dollarized banking system that lacked a credible lender of last resort (Uruguay and—to a 
lesser extent—Argentina). 
 
There is a vast literature that analyzes the links between macroeconomic and banking 
crises. This relationship can be mutually reinforcing as a banking crisis is bound to have 
important effects on key macroeconomic variables such as the fiscal deficit, interest 
rates, and the rate of economic growth. Meanwhile, macroeconomic factors are often the 
underlying reason behind a banking crisis.  
 
In addition to intrinsic banking problems such as poor management or other structural 
deficiencies, most banking problems, especially systemic ones, can be explained by 
adverse macroeconomic fundamentals or shocks, which at a certain moment can trigger 
sharp movements in a group of key macroeconomic variables that impact banks’ 
balance sheets. 
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There is wide coverage in the specialized literature of a range of banking crisis episodes 
showing the huge explanatory power of macroeconomic misalignments.
1 While this is 
true for both developed and developing countries, the latter face some additional threats 
and vulnerabilities. 
 
Banking systems in developing countries are often under pressure due to fiscal deficits 
(Honohan, 1997) that generate financial demands on banks. This can lead to an 
increase in the banks’ exposure to the public sector, which can in turn lead to a large 
deterioration in their creditworthiness and the disruption of banks’ equity and liquidity. 
The 1997/98 Asian and 2001 Argentine crises are clear examples of such a situation. 
Thus, the government budget and its sustainability represent an important variable that 
needs to be taken into account for many developing countries. 
 
However, macroeconomic issues do not explain every single banking stress episode. 
Sometimes there are other factors that are microeconomic in essence that underlie 
stress or crises events, such as structural deficiencies or poor management practices. 
Regulation and the behavior of financial intermediaries could be behind other crises, 
which can be labeled endogenous in the sense that they are generated because of the 
incentives or practices within the banking system. Usually, banks fuel much of the 
boom–bust financial cycles, even when they are the first to suffer the consequences of 
the boom suddenly ending. The recent subprime crisis is a clear example in this regard. 
 
Additionally, banking stress events are sometimes motivated by exogenous factors in 
that they are not the result of macroeconomic deterioration or intrinsic banking problems, 
but instead are driven by external shocks such as a crisis in a neighboring or partner 
country. The “Tequila effect” in Argentina in 1994/5 and the most recent financial crisis in 
some countries in Eastern Europe and Iceland are examples of such events, 
notwithstanding the role of internal financial excesses in the latter two examples. 
Contagion effects are sometimes motivated by fundamentals, such as cross-border 
exposures, but it is also common to see contagion between developing countries without 
objective fundamentals. These are externalities that create sources of vulnerability 
beyond the control of domestic authorities. The impact of the 1998 Russian crisis on 
Brazil—and subsequently other countries in Latin America—illustrates the point. 
 
Given the diversity of factors that could stress banks’ balance sheets, it is important to 
consider each carefully in the pursuit of a comprehensive approach. 
 
2.1   Main Macroeconomic Variables Affecting Banking Risks 
 
Macroeconomic factors affect banks’ performance both in normal times and in times of 
stress. A group of key variables—interest rates, exchange rates, economic growth, and 
unemployment—has a direct impact on banking risks. Even when this group of key 
variables is the only thing that has a direct impact on banks’ balance sheets, in a 
forward-looking approach it is still important to perform a complete assessment of 
macroeconomic fundamentals in order to anticipate eventual movements within that 
group. 
                                                  
1  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).  
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For instance, a current account problem has no direct impact on banks’ performance 
indicators, but it will have an indirect impact through interest rate and exchange rate 
movements and probably through economic activity and unemployment as well.  
 
Thus, we divide the analysis of macroeconomic factors affecting banks into two separate 
sections: (i) we first consider macroeconomic fundamentals in a broad sense and then 
(ii) focus on the group of key variables that has a direct impact on banks’ indicators. 
Hereafter, we will refer to those variables as triggers. 
 
  2.1.1   Fundamentals 
 
As mentioned above, we need to assess the broad macroeconomic picture in order to 
foresee risks and anticipate the buildup of banking vulnerabilities.  
 
There is not a unique macroeconomic model to analyze the macro-fundamentals, but 
each central bank should have its own framework. Proposing a new or specific model to 
perform macroeconomic monitoring is beyond the scope of this paper and there likely is 
not a single model that would fit all countries. Instead, tailor-made models used by 
individual central banks are usually the most appropriate. 
 
Whatever the model in use in an individual country, it should contemplate the country’s 
specificities and be able to deal with the evaluation and anticipation of typical 
macroeconomic problems that have been historically associated with banking crisis 
events. 
 
In general terms, these problems can be classified as follows (Kaminsky, 2003): 
 
•  current account deficit, 
•  debt burden and debt structure, 
•  sudden stops/reversal in capital flows, 
•  fiscal deficit, 
•  inflation, 
•  financial excesses, and 
•  protracted economic recession.  
 
Current account deficits can generate problems for the banking sector, especially when 
reaching a certain critical level (e.g., exceeding 4% of GDP), as it implies that the 
economy relies on foreign financing that may potentially be a source of vulnerability. 
Large and sustained current account deficits may imply increasing risk of a currency 
crisis or a major depreciation, which could lead to a sudden movement in interest rates 
and a sharp slowdown in economic activity following an abrupt stop or reversal of capital 
flows. 
 
Public debt and large financial requirements can also pose a problem for the banking 
system, especially if the public sector does not find voluntary financing in the capital 
markets, as banks could become a tempting source of liquidity. In the process, banks  
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might take on a large exposure to the public sector and face a high concentration of risk 
in one borrower. There are different ways to measure debt sustainability, although in 
many EMCs the key indicator is not only the amount of debt (e.g., measured as a ratio to 
GDP), but also the debt structure including the currency composition, amount of short-
term debt, and concentration of debt amortizations. Unfortunately, there are no set rules 
of thumb on these issues. In the case of the Maastricht Treaty, European Union member 
countries are required to maintain their public debt below 60% of GDP. However, this is 
an arbitrary number and most EMCs should probably have debt levels that are much 
lower. 
 
Other macroeconomic indicators that could be used as a sign of vulnerability are large 
levels of foreign borrowing, especially because EMCs are subjected to sudden stops 
(Calvo and Talvi, 2005) and high rates of inflation, which negatively affect long-term 
credit markets and can lead to periods of high real interest rates or protracted recessions 
that affect the ability of firms to remain financially sound. 
 
The literature provides a set of macroprudential indicators to monitor the likelihood of 
macroeconomic problems (IMF, 2000) as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Fundamentals and their Indicators 
Fundamental Problem  Indicators 
Current account  Current account balance/GDP 
  Terms of trade 
  Composition and maturity of capital flows 
 International  reserves 
 Real  exchange  rate 
 FX  volatility 
  
Debt  Currency structure of debt 
 Debt/Reserves 
 External  debt/Exports 
  Maturity structure of debt 
 Short-term  debt/Reserves 
  External debt service/current account 
  Interest rate volatility 
Fiscal problems  Fiscal balance/GDP 
Sudden stops  International real interest rate 
  
Inflation Inflation  rate  
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Fundamental Problem  Indicators 
 Volatility  in  inflation 
  
Financial excesses  Stock prices 
 Real  estate  prices 
 Domestic  credit/GDP 
 M2/Reserves 
  
Economic growth slumps  GDP growth rate 
 Output  GAP 
 Sectoral  slumps 
Source: Centennial Group 
FX = foreign exchange, GDP = gross domestic product. 
 
The indicators included in Table 1 should be measured on a forward-looking basis to be 
able to foresee eventual problems. As noted above, each central bank will have its own 
views and models to determine values for these indicators. 
 
2.1.2 Trigger  Variables 
 
Once macroeconomic fundamentals have deteriorated enough, or when an exogenous 
shock hits the domestic economy, sharp movements in the group of key macroeconomic 
variables known as triggers can be expected. This is what we call a stress event, which 
eventually leads to crisis. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the triggers and the kind of financial risk through which they impact 
banks’ balance sheets and solvency. 
 
 
Table 2: Triggers 
 
Variable  Banking Risk 
Exchange rates  Market 
Interest rates  Market/Liquidity 
Government bond prices  
(Government default)  Market/Liquidity/Credit 
Asset prices  Market/Liquidity/Credit 
Unemployment rate  Credit 
 
Source: Centennial Group 
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The triggers are variables that typically can move very quickly and (at some point) 
respond to imbalances in the fundamentals. Examples include the exchange rate, which 
can jump in response to a speculative attack on the currency; a sudden stop in capital 
inflows; and a protracted period of large current account deficits associated with a 
currency that is clearly overvalued. In other words, a trigger is a variable that directly 
affects banks’ balance sheets. In this respect, the current account is a macroeconomic 
problem, but its effects on the banking system only appear following a devaluation of the 
currency. Likewise, when the government has difficulty obtaining financing or rolling over 
its debt, the effects on the banking system generally take place through increases in 
domestic interest rates, leading to the crowding-out effect, or through a higher country 
risk. 
 
Thus, an example of a trigger includes a large depreciation of the currency, which is 
typically driven by an imbalance in the external accounts (i.e., large currency account 
deficits) or by efforts of the central bank to defend a clearly overvalued currency.  
 
The basic idea is that macroeconomic fundamentals do not directly affect the banking 
system, but rather affect it indirectly through different triggers that, in turn, have an 
impact on the banks´ balance sheets. Thus, both fundamentals and triggers have 
impacts on banks’ balance sheets and profit and loss (P&L) statements, albeit at 
different stages.  
  
There are cases in which the triggers can move without changes in the fundamentals, 
which suggests the need to understand triggers’ behavior even in cases when there are 
no apparent imbalances in the fundamentals. One example of these movements relates 
to financial bubbles, where asset prices or the exchange rate—two variables that have 
important effects on the banking system—can display large swings even without any 
significant change in fundamentals. One clear implication of this analysis is that even 
with a good evaluation of the fundamentals, one cannot rule out the possibility of 
movements in asset prices (or in the triggers). Hence, any thorough evaluation of 
vulnerabilities in the banking sector also needs to look at the evolution of the financial 
variables in order to try to detect whether there are worrying patterns. 
 
2.2 Fundamentals’  Deterioration vs. Exogenous Shocks   
 
As noted before, the triggers of a crisis are generally related to problems in the 
fundamentals or to external shocks hitting the economy. While there are models and 
analytical frameworks that allow policymakers to judge the status of the fundamentals, it 
is more difficult to anticipate external shocks such as deterioration in the terms of trade, 
tightening in foreign financing, sudden stops, or sharp swings in foreign currencies. In 
general, the models that try to determine the vulnerabilities of the economy basically 
take the external shocks as exogenous and then evaluate the potential ability of the 
economy to cope with it. Therefore, the status of the fundamentals plays an important 
role in this stage as they generally determine the impact of an external shock. 
 
Many crises in EMCs have resulted from a combination of a deterioration in economic 
fundamentals (e.g., fiscal imbalances and current account problems) that made policies 
unsustainable, even though the trigger of the crisis was often an external event. The  
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1997/98 Asian financial crisis, for instance, was affected by a fundamental problem—
excessive borrowing of EMCs in foreign currency—which was not a threat to individual 
economies or banking systems as long as exchange rates remained fixed. Once 
significant pressure on a currency materialized, due to a sudden stop of capital flows, 
and the central bank was forced to let the exchange rate float, the weak fundamentals 
meant that depreciation would have large and negative effects on the economy and 
banking system. 
 
Something similar occurred in the Russian crisis of 1998, when the main problem was a 
vulnerability in the fundamentals, namely a large amount of short-term debt issued in 
domestic currency that the government had to rollover at unsustainably high interest 
rates. While the money kept flowing in, the government managed to refinance it. 
However, at one point there was a sudden change in expectations as investors wanted 
to take money out of the system and this triggered a sharp increase in interest rates and 
a devaluation of the currency that hit the banking sector hard. Once again, the 
fundamental problems had been in place for some time, but the triggers of the crisis 
were large changes in interest rates and the exchange rate. 
 
Finally, the Argentine crisis is another example of an event that was caused by a 
combination of weaknesses in the macroeconomic fundamentals and in external 
conditions. The domestic problems were twin deficits, large financial requirements 
relative to the size of the domestic capital market, and a banking system that was highly 
dollarized and lacked both a lender of last resort and a credible deposit insurance 
system. In addition, as the country had a fixed exchange rate, it did not have an easy 
way to adjust to external problems. While the rest of the world was growing and willing to 
finance the country, the economy managed to grow and even remain financially sound. 
However, once external conditions changed—the US dollar strengthened in world 
markets, US interest rates increased, and commodity prices fell—concerns arose about 
the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate system and about the ability to obtain 
financing. Soon, Argentina was facing its worst economic and financial crisis in recent 
history. Once again, the problem was weak fundamentals, which implied vulnerabilities, 
and the trigger was the change in the external environment. 
 
 
3.  Systemic Banking Problems 
 
While macroeconomic fundamentals explain many banking stress events, 
microeconomic issues within the banking sector are also very important in assessing 
risks and the ability to withstand shocks. Moreover, many times endogenous 
vulnerabilities within the banking sector have generated or fueled macroeconomic crises 
even when the macro fundamentals had previously been in good shape. Usually, the 




                                                  
2  Blejer et al. (1997) developed a model showing how an exogenous shock provokes a run on deposits in 
an initially solvent banking system, creating a solvency crisis which finally leads to a contraction in 
economic activity.  
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As is the case with the economy as a whole, the banking sector faces two types of 
vulnerabilities: one related to individual weaknesses and another related to systemic 
problems against which an individual bank cannot insure itself. 
 
3.1  Banking Sector Fundamentals 
 
The typical problems of an individual bank arise as a result of weaknesses that can be 
detected by looking at variables such as: 
 
•  low profitability; 
•  asset and liability structure: currency mismatches, excessive duration, and 
interest rate mismatches; 
•  poor management (strategic and/or financial); 
•  deficient loan origination process and risk management and monitoring; and 
•  inadequate structure and low efficiency. 
 
When a bank faces important weaknesses in one or more of these areas, which are also 
the areas that bank supervision agencies typically monitor, it could either close a bank or 
require corrective measures to address the problems. The important step at this stage, 
especially if it is an isolated problem, is to take the right policy measures to avoid turning 
an individual bank’s problem into a systemic one. 
 
3.2  Banking Sector Shocks 
 
A second step in assessing the soundness and vulnerabilities of the banking system as 
a whole is to evaluate the overall bank safety net and its ability to provide financial 
stability. The main components of this assessment are the (i) quality of prudential 
regulation and supervision, which is important to ensure that bank managers and owners 
do not take excessive risk; (ii) rules of the deposit insurance system, which need to at 
least cover small depositors as a way to avoid bank panics; (iii) resolution system of 
bank failures, which is important to avoid fiscal losses; and (v) capacity of the central 
bank to act as a lender of last resort when a bank (or the banking system as a whole) 
faces liquidity problems. 
 
The existence of the safety net and its design can have an important effect on the 
stability of the banking system, especially when there are systemic problems that could 
lead to deposit runs or generalized solvency problems that could affect its performance 
and incentives. 
 
The typical triggers of systemic banking problems include (i) liquidity problems that can 
be caused by a run or a bank panic, (ii) a sharp drop in asset prices or a government 
default that affects the solvency of banks, (iii) a large increase in nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) that can be a leading indicator of a systemic crisis, and (iv) contagion from 
abroad. 
 
In order to assess the vulnerability of the banking system to these type of shocks, an 
analytical framework is needed that combines the traditional bank fundamentals, which  
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should be designed to assess the banks’ solvency and liquidity, with a separate 
assessment of the system’s safety net. 
 
 
Table 3: Fundamentals and Shocks within the Banking System 
 
Problems  Indicators 
Fundamentals Capital  ratios 
 Leverage  ratios 
 NPLs  ratios 
  NPLs coverage ratios 
  Credit and deposit concentration 
  Dollarization of assets and liabilities 
  Exposure to the public sector 
 Sovereign  yield  Spreads 
  Liquidity ratios and gaps 
  Access/liquidity of secondary markets 
  Central bank credit to financial entities 
  Interest rate/duration gaps 
 Currency  gaps 
 ROA 
 ROE 
 Efficiency  ratios 
  Credit growth rate 
Shocks  Deposit growth rate 
 Asset  prices 
 Government  default 
 Exchange  rate 
 NPLs 
 Collateral  values 
 Cross-border  exposures 
NPLs = nonperforming loans, ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity 
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4.  A Methodology for the Assessment of Banking Risks 
 
This section presents a methodology similar to Mermelstein (2009) to develop an 
analytical framework that can be used to identify early warning indicators to detect 
problems in the banking system. This approach combines a traditional macro-financial 
analysis that considers different macroeconomic and financial scenarios, including the 
worst-case ones, with stress-test methods that incorporate those scenarios into the 
banks’ balance sheets and evaluates the dynamic evolution of the banking system over 
a period of time. While this methodology relies on stress-testing practices, deviating from 
the typical early warning system approach developed by Kaminsky et al. (1999), it 
generates a vulnerability indicator—projected over time—that is very useful in detecting 
potential problems in the banking system at an early stage. 
 
From an analytical point of view, we divide the analysis into five successive steps, which 
can be summarized as follows:  
 
•  In the first step, we develop a set of macroeconomic and financial scenarios that 
is based on a standard macroeconomic framework and attempts to detect main 
macro-vulnerabilities and their impact on key financial variables. The analysis 
then centers on adverse macroeconomic scenarios that might take place under 
plausible—albeit low probability—conditions. These scenarios are developed 
(see Section 4.1) using judgment based on widely accepted analytical 
frameworks, historical data, and experience, or by simulating alternative 
scenarios using Monte Carlo techniques.
3 
 
•  The second step is to model in some detail the relationship that exists between 
the macroeconomic scenarios, the variables that are defined as the critical ones 
(the triggers, such as the exchange rate or the interest rates, among others), and 
the banks’ balance sheets and P&L statements both, on impact and over a 12-
quarter simulation period (see Section 4.2). 
 
•  In the third step there is an evaluation of the evolution over a 12-quarter period of 
the various risk indicators that are developed in the model—liquidity, market, 
credit, solvency—under the different macro-financial scenarios (see Section 4.3, 
4.4, and 4.5). 
 
•  The fourth step involves the selection of appropriate thresholds for each of the 
risk indicators that are considered in the model in order to detect when they 
would enter into a “problem zone,” which is a range of values indicating whether 
the system is facing some type of vulnerability. In simple terms, a problem zone 
is equivalent to determining whether there is a green, yellow, or red traffic light, 
which is not a simple task in the evaluation of risks in the banking system (see 
Section 4.6). 
 
                                                  
3  A Monte Carlo application is described in Mermelstein (2009).  
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•  The final step is to determine the number of risk indicators that enter into the 
problem zone and to estimate the magnitude of the problem. All of this 
information is then summarized in a single indicator—the vulnerability index.  
 
When run on a regular basis (e.g., monthly), the analysis of the evolution of the 
vulnerability index would allow for the detection of vulnerabilities on a forward-looking 
basis. Therefore, the vulnerability indicator provides an early warning of banking 
problems, which can alert regulatory authorities to implement contingency or mitigation 
plans in advance. 
 
 





One of the attractive features of this approach is that it provides a detailed diagnosis of 
the type of risk that could trigger a stress event by providing a list of the risk indicators 
that would enter into the problem zone and providing some indication of the extent of the 
seriousness of the risk. 
 
The effectiveness of this approach depends to a large extent on the ability of the banking 
supervisor to develop relevant and consistent adverse macroeconomic scenarios, 
especially when applying judgmental scenarios. As mentioned in section 2, there is a 
large literature on the subject and policymakers generally have access to models that 
can provide them with the scenarios needed to run the simulations.  
 
The critical element of our approach is to incorporate into the analytical framework a 
dynamic and forward-looking stress-testing methodology that will allow the supervisor or 
regulator to trace the effects of different macroeconomic scenarios on the banking  
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As in any stress-testing exercise, it is critical to have a good understanding of the type 
and magnitude of the shocks that the economy might face and how they would impact 
the banking system. One of the main challenges is the ability to anticipate worst-case 
scenarios. This view reinforces the need to model macroeconomic and financial shocks, 
and to identify the relationship that exists between the macro-fundamentals and their 
effects on the triggers, including some calculation of the quantitative effects (e.g. the 
magnitude of a currency depreciation in response to capital outflows or a current 
account deficit).  
 
The following sub-section describes specific details of the proposed methodology. 
 
4.1  Macroeconomic Drivers and Banking Parameters 
 
Macroprudential monitoring requires a thorough examination of macroeconomic and 
banking events that could potentially affect financial stability, in addition to other issues 
such as market, compliance, and structural data. Recent crises have demonstrated that 
while worst-case scenarios are difficult to envision they do take place and their 
occurrence probabilities have been systematically underestimated. Difficulties in 
predicting these episodes arise because the evidence is not easy to detect using 
historical data, while the use of quantitative approaches based on the assumption that 
the shocks are normally distributed does not give enough weight to the tails of the 
distribution and, hence, tends to underplay extreme events.  
 
While there has been some progress in the use of quantitative techniques, in an effort to 
achieve more realism in the scenarios that are considered, including the use of heavy-
tailed distributions for macro-financial variables that allow for the inclusion of event risk, 
there is also a move to consider judgmental scenario building. This could allow enough 
flexibility in order to incorporate extreme events that might be difficult to include in the 
quantitative models. In this sense, the methodology presented in this section does not 
elude the requirement of scenario building as a systematic process. 
 
Regardless of the process through which the different scenarios are built, the inputs that 
we use are a path of the various drivers that we consider over a 12-quarter period, which 
are inputs for the model, and a set of parameters that help us to understand some of the 
main stylized facts of the banking system. 
 
                                                  
4  Our proposal is based on what is known as “worst-case approach” in stress-testing, which relies on the 
elaboration of extremely adverse scenarios subject to a minimum plausibility constraint. The alternative 
approach is that known as the “threshold approach,” which tries to estimate the worst scenario that the 
banking system could withstand before entering into the problems zone (i.e., risk indicators overcoming 
pre-established thresholds). We keep in line with the former approach and thus still rely on the ability of 
the macroeconomic committee (supervisor or any other authority) to envision future plausible adverse 
scenarios. In this sense, our approach does not eliminate human subjectivity, but we do not believe it is 
possible to do so in any conceivable approach. It is well known that even completely quantitative 
methods do not eliminate all human subjectivity.  
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The drivers represent macroeconomic or financial variables such as the rate of growth of 
GDP or interest rates, while the parameters represent structural or regulatory features of 
the banking system such as the ratio of administrative expenditures to assets or reserve 
requirements. Parameters are allowed to change once and for all within the simulation 
period. 
 
The following table summarizes the drivers and parameters used as inputs by the model. 
 
Table 4: Model Inputs 
 
Driver  Definition 
Macroeconomic drivers   
GDP growth  Annual GDP growth rate 
Spot exchange rate  Local currency per unit of foreign currency 
Expected devaluation  Expected devaluation as implied by forward contracts 
Sovereign yield spread  Some measure of country risk (as EMBI or CDS 
spread) 
Var. Public Debt/GDP  Ratio’s annual growth rate 
Term structure of interest rates:   
  Movement size  Change in interest rates (in basic points) 
  Movement type  Curve movement type: Parallel/Steepening/Flattening 
  
Banking drivers and parameters   
Deposits’ growth rate by currency and type  Growth rate of deposits (q-o-q, broken down by 
currency and demand/term) 
Assets' loss given default  Defined as 1—recovery rate in case of default 
Administrative expenditures to assets  Ratio 
Non-interest income to net interest income  Ratio 
Safety net level of the financial system 
Intended to reflect public confidence on deposits’ 
convertibility (the ability of banks to refund deposits on 
request). Ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 reflects full 
credibility and 0 reflects no credibility. 
Reserve requirements by type of deposit  Reserve requirements ratio, broken down by type of 
deposit. 
Weights for risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
calculation  Used to calculate regulatory capital ratio 
Mark-to-market assets  A binary parameter so as to indicate whether assets are 
marked-to-market or not 
 
CDS = credit default swap, EMBI = Emerging Market Bond Index. 
Source: Centennial Group  
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These drivers and parameters are required as inputs for both the baseline and 
alternative scenarios. Alternative scenarios are supposed to reflect stress situations to 
be assessed and contrasted against a baseline. Instead of comparing between only two 
scenarios, this framework would allow performing simulation analysis to evaluate a 
continuum of alternative scenarios. 
 
4.2  Stylized Banking System’s Balance sheet 
 
The first building block of the stylized model is the balance sheet of the banking system. 
This balance sheet consists of a set of equations that relate assets and liabilities, as well 
as income statements and the banking system’s capital, with the underlying drivers and 
parameters depicted in the previous section to determine the balance sheet’s value and 
evolution over time. 
 
This interrelationship between balance sheet components and the set of macroeconomic 
and banking drivers and parameters is the heart of the approach, and allows for the 
assessment of impacts of potential macro-financial scenarios on banking stability on a 
forward-looking basis.  
 
This section seeks to present an intuitive and non-technical description of the model’s 
equations. A complete technical description can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
The starting point to describe the model structure is the stylized balance sheet upon 
which it is based, as depicted in table 5. 
 
 




Source: Centennial Group 
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Assets are classified by type, maturity, issuer, and denomination currency, according to 
the given specifications below. 
 
By type:  
 
Assets are divided into three groups. The first group encompasses liquid assets such as 
cash, deposits at the central bank, and similar assets.  
 
The second group of assets includes those that are held in the trading book. Assets in 
this book are marked-to-market and thus are subject to capital gains (losses) as market 
prices change. For instance, public bonds held in the trading book accrue capital losses 
when interest rates increase. 
 
The third group encompasses assets held in the banking book. These assets are 
registered at their par (or book) values and do not produce capital gains in response to 
changes in market prices. These kinds of assets are typically loans and some 
government bonds that are held within investment accounts. 
 
Liabilities include deposits and debt that are both registered at face values. Thus, no 
market price changes affect their value. 
 
Finally, banks’ equity completes the balance sheet structure and it results as the 
difference between assets and liabilities. Thus, changes in the value of assets held in 
the trading book (e.g., due to a movement in interest rates) impact on banks’ capital. 
 
By maturity:  
 
Assets and liabilities are broken down according to their maturity in order to model 
liquidity and interest rate risks. Each asset and liability is assigned to one of the following 
six maturity buckets: 
 




Each bucket represents a moment in time which, going forward, is expressed in 
quarters. Thus, if an asset is assigned to bucket #1, it means that the asset matures in 
1 quarter. If the asset were assigned to bucket #20, it would mean that the asset would 
mature in 20 quarters (5 years). Liquid assets and demand deposits are included in 
bucket zero, meaning immediate liquidity. 
 
The structure of assets and liabilities by maturity bucket is a very important feature of the 
balance sheet structure in terms of interest rate and liquidity risk. On one hand, a short-
term negative impact on interest rates could create a liquidity problem. On the other 
hand, interest rates on assets and liabilities contracted at fixed interest rates reset only 
at maturity. This implies that if liabilities have shorter maturities than assets, a parallel 
increase in the term structure of the interest rate curve will produce a negative impact on  
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net interest income. This negative impact takes place because higher interest rates will 
have to be paid on liabilities before a higher interest rate can be earned on assets.  
 
By issuer:  
 
In order to take into account banks’ exposure to the public sector, which typically has 
been a source of vulnerability for the banking systems of emerging market economies, 
assets are divided between those issued by the private and public sectors. 
 
By denomination currency:  
 
Additionally, assets and liabilities are classified according to their denomination 
(domestic or foreign currency) so as to consider currency risks. 
 
Table 6 shows a typical dataset of starting values for the model, displaying assets and 
liabilities broken down according to the full set of classification criteria. Data corresponds 
to the Argentine banking system (private banks) as of December 2008. 
 
 
Table 6: Cumulative Balance Sheet of Argentine Private Banks 
(December 2008, AR$ Million) 
 
Domestic Currency (c=1)    Foreign Currency (c=2) 
Maturity Buckets  Maturity Buckets   Total 
Total 
0 1 2 4  20  40 
Total 
0 1 2 4  20  40 
Assets  200,607 154,813 48,680  37,562 26,276 26,726 7,267 8,302 45,739 28,269 4,400  5,582  4,682 1,768 1,092
Liquid Assets  34,692  17,869  17,896  ---  --- ---  ---  ---  16,822 16,822 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Trading Book  15,366  14,004  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  1,361  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
   Private Sector  85  44  ---  0  0  17  24  3  41  ---  0  0  12  25  4 
Public Sector  15,281  13,961  ---  4,741 5,454  2,487  548  731  1,320  ---  0  86  403  489  343 
Banking Book  108,292  92,129  ---  ---  --- ---  ---  ---  ---  16,163 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
   Private Sector  88,220  73,488  ---  31,028 17,046 14,441 4,583 6,390 14,731 ---  4,400  5,497  4,124 266  444 
Public Sector  20,072  18,640  ---  1,793 3,776  9,782  2,112 1,177 1,432  ---  0  0  143  988  300 
Other Assets  42,257  30,811  30,811  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  11,447 11,447 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Liabilities  174,192 134,272 84,730  32,365 7,729  8,212  618  618 39,921 22,932 7,555  1,727  1,511 3,098 3,098
Deposits 129,057  107,968  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  21,089 ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  Demand Deposits  69,959  59,662  59,662  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  10,296 10,296 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
      Term Deposits  59,098  48,306  ---  32,365 7,729  8,212  ---  ---  10,792 ---  7,555  1,727  1,511 ---  --- 
Debt 7,432  1,236  ---  ---  ---  ---  618  618  6,196  ---  ---  ---  ---  3,098 3,098
Other Liabilities  37,704  25,068  25,068  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  12,636 12,636 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Capitals  26,415 20,542  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  5,873  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
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4.3  Dynamics throughout the Simulation Period 
 
Once an initial balance sheet structure is defined and the hypothetical scenarios are 
built, the model allows for an evaluation of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with 
them. The interrelationship between macroeconomic and banking drivers/parameters 
are taken into account by equations (1) to (27) in the model, as detailed in Appendix 1 
and depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Model Structure 
 
  
Source: Centennial Group 
 
 
The rounded grey variables in Figure 2 correspond to drivers or parameters, which are 
exogenously defined and used as inputs. Each hypothetical scenario produces a 
different set for these variables. 
 
The variables that are shown in green are the endogenous ones, while the variable 
representing banks’ capital is shown in light purple.  
 
The arrows scheme represented in the figure illustrates the signs of the 
interrelationships. Blue arrows represent a direct relationship (positive sign), red arrows 
an inverse relationship (negative sign), and grey arrows an indefinite relationship.   
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In order to illustrate the model’s logic, consider a simple sensitivity analysis where there 
is a shock that turns GDP growth negative. The red arrow that links the GDP growth rate 
with default probabilities indicates that when the GDP growth rate drops there will be an 
increase in default probabilities. This would have two subsequent effects: both interest 
rates and write-offs would increase. Then, the increase in interest rates would impact 
both interest rates earned on assets and those paid on liabilities. Following appropriate 
arrows, it can be seen that there would be (i) a negative impact on the value of assets 
held in the trading book (capital losses) and (ii) an uncertain impact on net interest 
income, depending on the duration gap between assets and liabilities. The final step is 
that the change in the value of assets held in the trading book would reduce the value of 
assets and net profits would be impacted due to the capital losses and changes in net 
interest income. All of these effects would have an impact on banks’ capital. 
  
The blue arrow connecting net profits and liquid assets shows that the model works 
adjusting liquid assets so as to balance assets and liabilities period-by-period in 
response to net profits evolution. That is, if there were net losses, there would be a 
decrease in liquid assets, while the opposite would hold in the event of net gains. 
 
This simple sensitive analysis is a demonstration of the intricate relationships among 
variables. In a more realistic exercise (e.g., the case of Argentina given below), the 
model should be used to analyze complete scenarios, which implies considering 
consistent changes in the whole set of drivers and parameters. 
 
4.4  Banking Risk Indicators 
 
The impacts of alternative scenarios can be summarized and assessed through the use 
of typical indicators of banking risk, such as those related with liquidity, interest rate and 
currency risks. While those indicators are usually based on historical data, the approach 
in this paper is forward-looking in the pursuit of anticipating the stress scenarios and 
vulnerabilities that might arise. 
 
While a technical description of these risk indicators is left for Appendix 1, this section 




We calculate different indicators to assess liquidity problems. On one hand, there are 
gap indicators, which measure the gap between the amount of assets and liabilities 
maturing in each of the maturity buckets, while on the other hand we calculate the 
accumulated gap for the complete simulation period. 
 
The typical banking system shows a negative gap for the shorter maturity buckets. This 
is usually compensated by long balances for the larger maturity buckets, which results in 
a positive accumulated gap. This is related to the typical function of the transformation of 
maturities that banks perform.  
 
There is not a standard way to determine whether or not an accumulated gap is 
excessive. Banks typically set targets for the accumulated gap at different maturities  
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according to their own market conditions and the volatility of their funding. For example, 
a bank could set a -25% percent target as a lower bound for the ratio of the 12-month 
accumulated gap to total liabilities. This target would constrain asset and liability 
management (ALM) decisions so as to maintain enough liquidity to ensure that the 1-
year accumulated gap is not greater in absolute terms than 25% of total liabilities. 
Therefore, if total liabilities were USD100, the accumulated gap should not be less than 
a negative amount of USD25. But for another bank, this target could be too loose if its 
funding were more volatile since targets and thresholds for the declaration of warnings 
are not homogeneous when assessing risks. While the model provides the eventual 
value for the indicator under alternative hypothetical scenarios, deciding whether those 
values imply vulnerability remains subjective and dependent on the context. This applies 
not only for liquidity risk indicators, but also for almost every risk indicator. 
 
In addition to gap indicators, it is possible to obtain some additional liquidity ratios from 
the model. Thus, the usual ratios between liquid assets and liabilities, and between liquid 
assets and reserve requirements, can be easily calculated. As the lower bounds for the 
second ratio are fixed by central bank regulations, there is no room for alternative criteria 
to foresee a liquidity problem. For the former ratio, targets are usually defined according 
to the market conditions and asset and liability features. 
 
Interest rate risk: 
 
The model provides two usual indicators that help to anticipate eventual vulnerabilities 
arising from changes in interest rates. The first is known as the “dollar GAP” indicator, 
which measures the difference between interest rate sensitive assets (RSA) and interest 
rate sensitive liabilities (RSL). An asset or liability is interest rate sensitive if it is 
contracted at variable rates or, alternatively, if it matures just after the movement in the 
term structure. The dollar GAP indicator is useful to anticipate the impacts of parallel 
movements of the term structure of interest rates on net interest income. 
  
For example, if a bank were to have RSA of USD100 and RSL of USD70, the dollar GAP 
would be USD30 (i.e., RSA – RSL). This implies that the bank has a long position on 
interest rates. For that reason, a parallel increase
5 in the term structure of interest rates 
would benefit the bank by improving its net interest margin.  
 
The second indicator available is known as the “duration GAP,” which is the difference 
between the weighted average duration of assets and liabilities. Consider a bank that 
has an equal amount of assets and liabilities, with an average duration of assets of 
5 years and an average duration of liabilities of 3 years. Thus, the bank shows a duration 
GAP of 2. That means that the bank would suffer a capital loss in case of a parallel 
increase in the term structure of interest rates since the duration of its assets is larger 
                                                  
5  An increase or decrease in interest rates is considered parallel if the interest rates for different 
maturities change in the same magnitude and thus the shape of the yield curve does not change. 
Alternatively, other types of movements are usually known as steepening and flattening. A steepening 
movement takes place when the rates for long maturities increase and those for short maturities 
decrease.   
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than the duration of its liabilities.
6 The magnitude of the loss would be approximately 
equal to two times (duration gap value) the percentage increase in interest rates 
multiplied by the value of its assets, according to the following expression: 
 
Δ Capital ≅ - DurGAP * [ Δ i / (1 + i ) ] * A      (1) 
 
where i represents the relevant interest rate and A the value of total assets. 
 
Continuing with the example, a 200 basis points (bp) increase in interest rates from an 
initial value of 10% (assuming A =  USD100) would produce a capital loss of: 
 
Δ Capital ≅ - 2 * [ 0.02 / 1.1 ] * 100 ≅ - 3.63      (2) 
 
While the two indicators presented in this section are associated with interest rate risk, 
each allows assessing the risk from a different point of view. While the dollar gap 
indicator is closely related with the income statement, the duration gap is tied to the 
balance sheet through capital losses (gains) that could take place due to movements in 
interest rates. 
 
A neutral position in these gaps would represent a fully hedged position against interest 
rate risk. Banks usually vary their exposure by taking directional strategies according to 
their expectations on interest rates prospects. Evaluating whether a certain gap is 
excessive requires a well-founded outlook on interest rates prospects.  
 
Exchange rate risk: 
 
In order to anticipate the impact of exchange rate movements, the model provides an 
indicator of currency mismatch. This indicator is calculated as the difference between 
assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency as a share of banks’ capital. 
Negative values for this indicator represent a short position in foreign currency, which 
represents a downside risk in the event of a devaluation of the domestic currency.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, the existence of only one foreign currency is assumed so that 
there will be only one exchange rate. 
 
Suppose a bank with assets of USD100, of which USD30 are denominated in foreign 
currency, and with liabilities of USD70, of which USD20 are foreign currency 
denominated. Thus, the bank shows a 33% currency mismatch (i.e. 10 / 30). The 
positive sign of the resulting currency mismatch implies a long position in foreign 






                                                  
6  Duration approximates a measure of the drop (increase) in an asset price due to an increase (drop) in 
interest rates. The approximation is valid for small changes in interest rates.  




Among credit risk indicators, the model provides the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio and 
the write-offs rate (WR). For the sake of simplicity, the former ratio is equaled to default 
probabilities in this paper. In a more realistic implementation, specific models could be 
built. As default probabilities depend negatively on the GDP growth rate, so does the 
NPL ratio (Appendix 3). 
 
The WR also depends on the GDP growth rate, as it is a function of the default 
probability (PD), but also depends on the loss-given-default rate (LGDR). LGDR 
measures the share of defaulted debt that will not be recovered. In that sense, it is the 
effective loss rate in the event of default. Hence, the WR is given as: 
WR = PD * LGDR 
 
Exposure to the public sector is another credit risk indicator that can be calculated from 
the model. This exposure can be an important source of credit risk, especially when 
public sector finance faces stress periods as still happens cyclically in developing 





Sustained periods of low or negative profits could end in a solvency problem and even 
trigger some liquidity pressures when it undermines public confidence. 
 
Several indicators of profitability are derived from the model and provided as outputs. 
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are calculated, as well as an 
indicator of net interest income to total assets. At the same time, the model provides an 
implicit spread indicator to measure the difference between the implicit interest rate 
earned on loans and the implicit interest rate paid on deposits. 
 
Additionally, a specific indicator devoted to measure capital gains and losses is 
provided. Given the volatility usually shown by assets in emerging markets, it is an 





In order to foresee eventual problems related to solvency, some indicators are 
calculated. In addition to the calculation of banks’ capital under the baseline and stress 
scenarios, the ratio of capital to risk weighted assets is provided in order to assess 
whether it remains above the 8% required by standard regulations. Risk weighted assets 
is a well known concept within the Basel accord. Instead of a static capital requirement 
calculated over the value of total assets (e.g., 8% of total assets), the 8% capital 
requirement is applied on risk weighted assets. Thus, each asset type will be weighted 
according to its own risk. For instance, a consumer loan would be weighted riskier 
(e.g., 75%) than a mortgage (e.g., 35%), as the latter would be secured by collateral. 
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In addition, a measure of leverage is provided by another indicator, which measures the 
ratio of banks’ debt to equity. The lower this indicator is the more capitalized the banking 
system and the stronger the solvency position of the system. 
 
4.5  Relationship between Inputs and Outputs 
 
Thus far, we have described the macroeconomic and banking drivers and parameters 
used as inputs by the model, the interrelationships among model variables, and the risk 
indicators that can be calculated from the model. 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the qualitative relationships among the inputs 
of the model (macroeconomic and banking drivers) and the outputs (risk indicators). A 
more rigorous description is included in Appendixes 1 and 2. 
 
However, the interrelationships do not always have the same sign since they depend on 
the balance sheet structure. For instance, an increase in the nominal exchange rate 
could have a positive or negative initial impact on net worth, depending on whether the 
banking system initially has a net long or short position in foreign currency. Likewise, an 
increase in interest rates would imply a capital loss if the banking system had a long 
position in long duration instruments. Nevertheless, the overall impact of a change in 
interest rates on the income statement will also depend on the effects that the higher 
interest rates eventually have on net interest income, which to some extent can 
compensate the capital loss. Thus, the overall effects of changes in the critical 
macroeconomic and financial variables on the banking system depend on the initial 
structure of the balance sheet. 
 
For illustrative purposes, the matrices that follow present the signs of the impact that 
changes in the inputs (e.g., GDP growth, interest rates, and exchange rates) have on the 
outputs of the model for the particular case of the group of Argentine private banks as of 
December 2008. As our simulation period encompasses 12 quarters, the first matrix 
shows the immediate impact on outputs of changes in inputs (short-term impacts), while 




OUTPUTS  INPUTS 


































GAPs  ( - )  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  --- 
   Liquidity 
ratios  ---  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ---  ( - )  ( + )  ( - )  --- 
Interest 
rate risk  Dollar GAP  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ( - )  ( + )  ---  
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OUTPUTS  INPUTS 































   Duration 




mismatch  ---  ---  ---  ( + )  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Credit Risk  NPLs  ---  ( - )  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
   Write-offs 






( - )  ---  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  --- 
Profitability  ROA  ( - )  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( + ) 





---  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  ( + ) 
   Implicit 
spread  ---  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + ) 
   Net capital 
gains  ( - )  ---  ( - )  ( + )  ( - )  ---  ---  ( - )  --- 
Solvency  Capital  ( - )  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ---  ( - )  ---  ( - )  --- 
   Leverage  ( + )  ---  ( - )  ---  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  --- 
   Capital / 





OUTPUTS  INPUTS 


































GAPs  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  --- 
   Liquidity 
ratios  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + ) 
Interest 
rate risk  Dollar GAP  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ( - )  ( + )  ---  
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OUTPUTS  INPUTS 































   Duration 




mismatch  ( - )  ---  ( + )  ---  ( - )  ( - )  ---  ( + )  ( + ) 
Credit Risk  NPLs  ---  ---  ---  ---  ( + )  ---  ---  ---  --- 
   Write-offs 






( - )  ---  ( - )  ---  ( - )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  --- 
Profitability  ROA  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( + ) 





( + )  ( + )  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + )  ( + ) 
   Implicit 
spread  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  ( - )  ( + ) 
   Net capital 
gains  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ---  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  --- 
Solvency  Capital  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  --- 
   Leverage  ( - )  ---  ( - )  ---  ( - )  ( + )  ( + )  ( + )  --- 
   Capital / 
RWA  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ---  ( + )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  --- 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, etc. 
Note: (+) indicates a positive dependence, (-) indicates an inverse dependence, and --- represents no direct dependence. 
Columns represent inputs and rows represent banking risk indicators that result as outputs from the model. 
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It should be noted that these matrices represent what would have happened in the 
specific case of the balance sheet structure that the group of Argentine private banks 
displayed as of December 2008. An alternative balance sheet structure would produce 
significantly different matrices. 
 
To illustrate how to use these matrices, assume a shock on interest rates that shifts the 
whole yield curve upwards. This shock is represented by the first column of inputs 
(interest rates – parallel change). The matrices above provide the impact signs that 
would be observed. 
 
For the case of liquidity risk, the sign is negative in the short-term (for the case of 
liquidity gaps, but not for the liquidity ratios) and it turns positive as time goes by. This is 
because the increase in interest rates has an immediate negative impact on net interest 
income, as the liquidity gaps are negative for short-term maturity buckets. As assets 
mature and are reinvested, the bank starts to benefit from the higher interest rates that it 
earns on the new assets. Profits eventually improve and, hence, they present a positive 
sign in the long-run after having been negative immediately after the interest rate shock.  
 
In addition, the increase in interest rates also produces immediate capital losses due to 
the interest rate shock as the present value of those assets that are held in the trading 
book declines. However, those losses are offset once net interest income increases in 
time. This dynamic is reflected by the negative sign for net capital gains in the matrix for 
the short-run impacts, and by the null sign in the long-run matrix. 
 
There is a good deal of information that the model provides in giving a complete 
qualitative description of the impacts that the different drivers and parameters can have 
on the banking risk indicators. 
 
4.6  Defining Thresholds for Risk Indicators 
 
There is not a unique or best recipe on how to establish thresholds so as to determine 
admissible values for risk indicators. When the indicator is part of the regulation 
parameters (e.g., capital adequacy ratio [CAR]), it is easier as the threshold is already 
established by the central bank or included in the Basel principles. For the case of the 
CAR, the floor is 8%, so the selected threshold should be 8% or above. 
 
But when we look at risk indicators that are not subject to direct regulation, establishing 
an appropriate threshold becomes a more subtle task. The final purpose is to define a 
cut-off that best discriminates between crises or problem times from tranquil times. The 
examination of historical information is usually an appropriate way, which can be done 
by simple inspection or by more sophisticated analysis. The literature provides some 
options in this sense based on the minimization of the noise-to-signal ratio (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999) or some other variants (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; and 
Borio and Drehmann, 2009). 
 
Alternatively, in cases where historical information is lacking, one could preset the 
thresholds based on judgmental analysis. 
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4.7  Accounting for Projected Vulnerabilities as an Early Warning 
Indicator 
 
As in Mermelstein (2009), the last step to complete our methodology involves 
summarizing the projected vulnerabilities in one metric so as to use it as an early 
warning indicator. 
 
There are several different ways to add up the projected values for the risk indicators, 
most of which are straightforward. We suggest one of them, summarized in the following 
steps: 
 
(i) detect risk indicators entering into the problem zone under the projected scenario; 
(ii) for those indicators, calculate the (squared) distance between their projected 
values from their respective thresholds; and 
(iii) add up all those distances. 
 
The sum can be understood as the value for our vulnerability indicator, which is a pure 
number without a meaning in itself. Its usefulness derives from its use as a metric for 
chronological comparisons. This requires establishing a baseline period and then 
calculating it on a regular basis in order to measure its variation.  
 
As shown in the application for Argentina in section 5, during the years 2000 and 2001, 
before the crisis that took place at the end of 2001, our indicator showed a significantly 
higher mark than was observed for 1997 or 1998, which were 2 years of tranquil times. 
Therefore, the indicator could have been used to help to foresee that some 
vulnerabilities were building up within the banking system. 
 
An increase in the indicator, however, does not necessarily anticipate a crisis. What the 
increase means is that the system is losing soundness and its ability to tackle shocks. Of 
course, there are some feedback effects and a huge increase in the indicator might 
signal an impending crisis episode in the form of a banking crisis. 
 
4.8  Scope and Limitations of this Exercise 
 
This section has presented a conceptual illustration of a methodological approach that 
seeks to anticipate banking vulnerabilities. By its nature, it is very general and it requires 
a number of refinements in order to be applied to specific banking systems or to asses 
the vulnerability of individual banks. For example, the number of maturity buckets that 
are considered in a specific case need to be adapted to the actual structure of assets 
and liabilities of the system to be analyzed. There is a need to estimate or calibrate 
alternative specific models for default probabilities based on historical data from the 
economy and of the banking system under study. Instead of assuming two scenarios 
(base and alternative), stochastic simulation could be used to provide a continuum of 
alternative scenarios and cross-credit exposures among entities, while second-round 
and other effects related with a bottom–up approach could complement this top–down 
methodology.  
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This approach was followed because the purpose of this paper is mainly to provide a 
conceptual framework to develop early warning indicators of financial vulnerability, as 
opposed to providing a detailed model of the financial system for a specific country that 
quantifies these measures in a more precise way. Nevertheless, the analysis that we 




5.  The Model in Action: The Case of Argentina 
 
This section develops an illustrative example of the proposed methodology for the case 
of the group of Argentine private banks. The first part is devoted to simulate alternative 
scenarios, starting with the banks’ balance sheet as of December 2008 to gain familiarity 
with the projection model.  
 
In the second part, a specific scenario is applied chronologically to the successive 
banks’ balance sheets, starting in 1997 and ending in late 2001 just before the onset of 
the crisis. The objective is to show how well a vulnerability indicator built with our 
methodology would have performed in anticipating the crisis as an early warning 
indicator. 
 
5.1 Scenario  Simulations 
 





As described in Section 4, assets and liabilities in the balance sheet are broken down 
according to several criteria: 
 
•  Currency: indicates whether assets and liabilities are denominated in domestic or 
foreign currency. 
•  Maturity buckets: each asset and liability is assigned to the corresponding bucket, 
according to its maturity. 
•  Assets are broken down (i) according to their type, (ii) between liquid assets, (iii) 
assets held in the trading book, (iv) assets held in the banking book, and (v) other 
assets. Additionally, assets are divided into those issued by the private sector and 
those issued by the public sector whenever applicable. Other assets are those 
that are not of first importance in performing risk assessment exercises, such as 
fixed assets. 
•  Liabilities are split between deposits, debt, and other liabilities. Deposits are 
divided into demand and time deposits. Other liabilities include all liabilities that 
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Table 7: Cumulative Balance Sheet of Argentine Private Banks 
(December 2008, AR$ million) 
 
Domestic Currency (c=1)    Foreign Currency (c=2) 
Maturity Buckets  Maturity Buckets   Total 
Total 
0 1 2 4  20  40 
Total 
0 1 2 4  20  40 
Assets  200,607 154,813 48,680  37,562 26,276 26,726 7,267 8,302 45,739 28,269 4,400  5,582  4,682 1,768 1,092
Liquid Assets  34,692  17,869  17,896  ---  --- ---  ---  ---  16,822 16,822 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Trading Book  15,366  14,004  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  1,361  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Private Sector  85  44  ---  0  0  17  24  3  41  ---  0  0  12  25  4 
Public Sector  15,281  13,961  ---  4,741 5,454  2,487  548  731  1,320  ---  0  86  403  489  343 
Banking Book  108,292  92,129  ---  ---  --- ---  ---  ---  ---  16,163 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Private Sector  88,220  73,488  ---  31,028 17,046 14,441 4,583 6,390 14,731 ---  4,400  5,497  4,124 266  444 
Public Sector  20,072  18,640  ---  1,793 3,776  9,782  2,112 1,177 1,432  ---  0  0  143  988  300 
Other Assets  42,257  30,811  30,811  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  11,447 11,447 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Liabilities  174,192 134,272 84,730  32,365 7,729  8,212  618  618 39,921 22,932 7,555  1,727  1,511 3,098 3,098
Deposits 129,057  107,968  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  21,089 ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Demand Deposits  69,959  59,662  59,662  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  10,296 10,296 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Term Deposits  59,098  48,306  ---  32,365 7,729  8,212  ---  ---  10,792 ---  7,555  1,727  1,511 ---  --- 
Debt 7,432  1,236  ---  ---  ---  ---  618  618  6,196  ---  ---  ---  ---  3,098 3,098
Other Liabilities  37,704  25,068  25,068  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  12,636 12,636 ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Capitals  26,415 20,542  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  5,873  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Source: Centennial Group, based on Argentine Central Bank data. 
 
The table shows that the system had total assets of AR$200.6 billion, of which 
AR$154.8 billion was denominated in domestic currency and AR$45.8 billion in foreign 
currency. Total liabilities amounted AR$174.2  billion, of which AR$129  billion was 
deposits, and net worth amounted AR$26.4 billion. 
 
In addition to balance sheet values, there is a set of parameters and market values 
required as starting values. It consists of: 
 
•  International zero coupon rates corresponding to the maturity buckets of the 
model. 
•  Default probabilities corresponding to the average probability of default in the 
economy, being valid in the initial period and broken down by currency. This is a 
simplification that could be avoided by entering different default probabilities 
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For simulations, the following values were entered: 
 
             Spot Interest Rates—US                                      Domestic Probabilities 








2 0.383%     
4 0.607%     
8 1.259%     
12 1.897%     






Macroeconomic and banking drivers 
 
In addition to the starting values, a set of macroeconomic and banking drivers defining a 
baseline and an alternative (e.g., stress case) scenario is required.
7 The simulation 
period encompasses 12 quarters, as well as the time length for drivers’ projections. 
While in this paper a set of values are judgmentally defined, the dynamic process 
underlying the evolution of drivers could be treated with usual stochastic models 




10 for interest rates). 
 
Macroeconomic drivers include the evolution over 12 quarters for the following variables: 
 
•  spot exchange rate, defined as units of local currency per unit of foreign currency; 
•  expected devaluation, as implied in futures markets; 
•  sovereign yield spread, as implied in credit default swaps or, alternatively, as 
measured by emerging market bond indices (EMBI);  
•  annual percentage change in the ratio of public debt to GDP; and, 
•  GDP growth rate, measured as an annual percentage change. 
 




                                                  
7  If a stochastic simulation approach were followed, at this point the parameters describing the probability 
distributions of drivers and the correlations among them should be introduced.  
8 Vasicek, O. 1977. An Equilibrium Characterization of the Term Structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics. Vol. 5. pp. 177–188. 
9  Cox, J.C.; J.E. Ingersoll; and S.A. Ross. 1985. A Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. 
Econometrica. Vol. 53. pp. 385–407. 
10 Svoboda, S. 2004. Interest Rate Modeling (Finance and Capital Markets). Palgrave Macmillan.  
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   var. q-o-q 




0  3.85  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  2.0% 
1  3.97  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  -2.5% 
2  4.08  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  -2.5% 
3  4.21  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  -2.5% 
4  4.33  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  -2.5% 
5  4.46  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  1.5% 
6  4.60  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  1.5% 
7  4.74  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  1.5% 
8  4.88  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  1.5% 
9  5.02  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  3.0% 
10  5.17  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  3.0% 
11  5.33  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  3.0% 
12  5.49  3.0%  10.0%  0.0%  3.0% 
 
Source: Centennial Group 
 
 
On the banking side, assumptions have to be made about the evolution of deposits. The 
quarter-over-quarter growth rate of deposits is required, divided by the type of deposit 
(demand or term) and currency (domestic or foreign). As for other drivers, specific 
models can be implemented to forecast the evolution of deposits.  
 




Finally, the following parameters are required for each scenario: 
 
•  administrative expenditures to assets; 
•  LGDR: a measure ranging between 0 and 1 of the effective loss in case of default, 
after considering the percentage of the exposure at default that is recovered; 
•  non-interest income to net-interest income: a measure indicating the percentage 
of net revenue that comes from fees and concepts other than interests; 
•  safety net in the financial system: a quantitative representation of public 
confidence in the convertibility of deposits, ranging between 0 and 1, where 1 
represents full confidence and 0 signals no confidence;  
•  Weights for RWA calculation; and, 
•  Reserve requirements, measured as ratios of demand and time deposits.  
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For simulations, the following parameters are assumed: 
 
Parameter    
Loss Given Default  35.0% 
Administrative Expenditures to Assets  7.0% 
Non Interest Income to Net Interest Income  66.7% 
Safety Net Level  85.0% 
Reserve requirements    
Current & Savings Accounts  19.0% 
Term Deposits  15.0% 
 
 
Weights for RWA Calculation  Maturity Buckets 
   1  2  4  20  40 
Claims on Private Sector  85%  85%  85%  85%  50% 
Claims on Public Sector  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 
Source: Centennial Group 
 
Having defined required parameters and baseline dynamics of macroeconomic and 
banking variables, the next step is to define alternative scenarios. Three alternative 
scenarios were assessed, with each scenario progressively gaining in realism. Each of 
these scenarios are presented and discussed below. 
 




•  Devaluation of domestic currency represented by a 40% increase in the spot 
exchange rate during the first simulation year, increasing by 12.5% per year in 
subsequent years. 
•  One-time 500 bp parallel increase of interest rates in quarter 1. 
•  Contraction of GDP by 5% over the first two simulation years, followed by GDP 




Argentine private banks entered the assessment showing a positive mismatch in foreign 
currency. A devaluation of the domestic currency increases the long position in foreign 
currency during some quarters (until about the fifth quarter), when it starts to decrease 
again as the net position in domestic currency recovers weight progressively due to the 
fact that net revenues are in the domestic currency.  
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On the stocks side, the devaluation impacts banks balance sheets positively due to their 
starting long position in foreign currency. It represents a capital gain that takes effect 
immediately after the exchange rate increase. 
 
 
















However, the increase in interest rates impacts negatively on banks’ capital in small 
amounts as the bulk of assets is held in the banking books—54% of total assets 
compared to 8% in the case of assets held in the trading book—so that they are not 
marked-to-market on a regular basis. This result would be different if more assets were 
held in the trading books (e.g., alternative scenario 3). 
 
Once assets mature and interest rates reset over time, the assumed rise in interest rates 
generates an increasing implicit spread. This effect produces additional profits over time  
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so that the net interest income, as well as the ROA, is always greater than in the 
baseline scenario. In addition, as net profits are not distributed and accumulated as 
liquidity (as a simplifying assumption), every indicator measured as a ratio to assets 
(e.g., ROA) tends to decline over time. 
 
 

































A contraction in GDP does not produce an impact as significant as those described 
previously. Nevertheless, it generates an increase in credit problems, as reflected by a 
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Under this scenario, there are no problems with capitalization. Conversely, banks’ capital 
increases as profits do.  
 
On the liquidity side, there are no negative effects under this scenario, as deposits are 
not assumed to change at this stage. This probably does not seem realistic enough 
though given that a currency devaluation with increasing interest rates and a GDP 
contraction should trigger a drop on deposits. For this reason, the following alternative 
scenario incorporates a drop in deposits. 
 




•  Devaluation of domestic currency represented by a 40% increase in the spot 
exchange rate during the first simulation year, increasing by 12.5% per year in 
subsequent years. 
•  One-time 500 bp parallel increase of interest rates in quarter 1. 
•  Contraction of GDP by 5% over the first two simulation years, followed by GDP 
growth of 0% from the third year on. 
•  Decline of 25% in all types of deposits over the first simulation year, followed by 
0% growth from the second year on. 
 
This scenario incorporates the previous the assumption of a 25% drop in deposits during 
the first year. Specifically, it assumes a 9.5% drop during the first two quarters, 5% drop 
in the third quarter, and 3.5% drop in the fourth quarter. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, no distinction is made between foreign- and local-currency- 
denominated deposits, or between demand and time deposits. Nevertheless, 68% of  
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time deposits mature during the first simulation quarter (maturity bucket 1), hence, for 
simulation purposes, they do not perform very differently from demand deposits. 
 
What is seen under this new scenario is that the liquidity position reaches the lower 
admissible bound, at least from a regulatory point of view, as the ratio of liquid assets to 
reserve requirements displays a minimum near 1 during quarters 3 and 4 of the first 
simulation year. This could indicate a situation in which some liquidity assistance is 
needed, at least in small amounts. If properly managed and further negative effects are 
avoided, the situation would tend to improve from going forward as the balance sheet 
structure, in combination with the increased interest rates, would help to increase profits 
and rebuild liquidity. 
 



















•  Devaluation of domestic currency represented by a 40% increase in the spot 
exchange rate during the first simulation year, increasing by 12.5% per year in 
subsequent years. 
•  One-time 1000 bp parallel increase of interest rates in quarter 1. 
•  Contraction of GDP by 5% over the first two simulation years, followed by GDP 
growth of 0%. 
•  Decline of 25% in all types of deposits over the first simulation year, followed by 
0% growth. 
•  Marked-to-market public bond holdings. 
 
Under this scenario, adding the assumption of mark-to-market government bonds, which 
are otherwise held in investment accounts, allows for a gain in realism and an  
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assessment of the actual economic condition of the system independent of accounting 
practices. To stress the effect, interest rates are assumed to jump 1000 bp. 
 
While the initial impact of changing from marking-to-book to marking-to-market with 
respect to public bonds could be either positive or negative depending on current market 
values, the assumption is that those holdings were always accounted at market prices 
so as to assess the eventual impact of interest rate movements over the simulation 
period. Therefore, by moving the holdings from the banking to the trading book at the 
beginning of the exercise, the impact of the 1000 bp parallel increase in interest rates is 
evaluated. 
 
The increase in interest rates once public bonds are marked-to-market generates a 
much more important negative impact in terms of capital losses as the holdings 
decrease in value. 
 















After the initial capital loss, a subsequent devaluation of the local currency produces new 
capital gains that are even greater than in the base case scenario since the devaluation 
is larger. 
 
Additionally, increased interest rates contribute to a larger net interest rate margin and, 
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Regarding liquidity, the situation would remain the same as in scenario 2 since marking–
to-market assets does not generate cash flow changes. That is, the assumed deposit 
outflows would produce a very tight liquidity situation and temporary assistance from the 
central bank would likely be needed. 
 
The results show a somewhat paradoxical situation in which an extremely adverse 
scenario that generates an initial negative impact would eventually produce a significant 
improvement. 
 
These results need to be interpreted with caution. They show a banking system that 
would become extremely vulnerable during the first simulation year as liquidity problems 
arise in combination with a strong decline in profits. The subsequent improvement would  
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only take place if the period of huge vulnerability were successfully overcome and it 
would mostly likely require sound policies on the part of the central bank. 
 
The model shows that this adverse scenario would only have transitory effects if the right 
policy actions are taken to overcome it. In such a scenario, the adverse impacts would 
fade out relatively quickly (2 years), suggesting that the balance sheet structure would 
essentially remain healthy in the long run under current assumptions. However, at the 
same time, the model is showing that any lack of policy responses slip during the first 
year could lead to a disruptive situation.  
 
5.2  The Methodology and Early Warnings of the 2001 Crisis in Argentina 
 
The proposed methodology was applied to the case of Argentina in an exercise that 
evaluated the evolution of the banking system from 1997 to mid-2001, which is just 
before the peak of the banking crisis. The purpose of the exercise is to show the 
evolution of the vulnerability indicator starting in a relatively tranquil year and ending in 
the immediacy of the 2001 crisis. As will be seen, the indicator remained relatively flat 
during the first 2 years, except for a short period in 1998 during the Russian debt crisis. 
Beginning in early 1999, the indicator showed a significant upward trend, suggesting that 
financial vulnerabilities were starting to build up. In addition, we will show that an 
analysis of the evolution of the indicator’s subcomponents would be very useful to 
understand the different sources of vulnerability that were taking place prior to the crisis. 
 
The methodology that was used for the Argentine experience can be summarized as 
follows:  
 
•  We collected monthly data from January 1997 to May 2001
11 for the group of 
private banks, as in the previous section. 
•  For each month, we simulate the trajectories for the risk indicators over a 12-
quarters period under the same assumptions applied in alternative scenario 3. 
The scenario was held constant to make the projections and the risk indicators 
comparable along time.  
•  In line with the methodology developed in section 4, in the case of Argentina we 
consider that the five critical risk indicators to measure the vulnerability of the 
banking system during this period were:  
 
o currency  mismatch, 
o profitability,   
o liquidity, 
o  capital adequacy, and  
o  exposure to the public sector. 
 
We then defined a threshold for each indicator in order to separate the tranquil from the 
problem zone. The threshold for the liquidity risk indicator—liquid assets to reserve 
                                                  
11 We shortened the period by ending in May 2001 instead of December 2001 due to data availability.  
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requirements—was defined based on whether the banks were complying with the 
regulatory requirements, while the remaining thresholds were chosen in a judgmental 
way by looking at their historical behavior and analyzing how they had performed during 
periods of financial turmoil. The following table summarizes the selected thresholds. 
 
Table 9: Thresholds for the critical risk indicators 
 
Indicator  Definition  Threshold value  Threshold type 
Exposure to the 
public sector 
Claims on the public sector / Total 
assets  15% Cap 
Capital adequacy 
(Leverage)  Total assets / Net worth  x 10  Cap 
Currency risk  (Assets – 1.4 * Liabilities) / Net 
worth
12  - 200%  Floor 
Profitability  Return on assets  0%  Floor 
Liquidity risk  Liquid assets / Reserve 
requirements  x 1  Floor 
 
Once the projected values were calculated for each indicator, we determined which ones 
entered into their respective problem zones. For the indicators in the problem zones, we 
calculated their squared values in order to neutralize the effect of their signs
13 and added 
them over the 12-quarters simulation period. Finally, we normalized them as an index 
number by defining the average value for the year 2000 as a base period.  
 
As a final step, the index numbers for each indicator were added up into a single 
measure, which we defined as the vulnerability index. In this case, we weighted equally 
all the index numbers. Alternatively, different weights could be assigned to each. This 
single index of banks’ vulnerability summarizes our assessment of the banking system. 
By comparing it along the time series, we can observe the behavior of the indicator and 
its ability to function as an early warning indicator. 
 
In what follows, we present a short illustrative example of how we made the calculations. 
Assuming a simulation span of 4 periods, the next table shows a hypothetical projection 





                                                  
12 By multiplying liabilities by 1.4, we provide a more restrictive measure of currency risk so as to reflect 
the particular situation of Argentina during the final years of the convertibility period in which borrowers’ 
income was denominated in domestic currency while banks’ deposits were denominated in foreign 
currency. Even when typical mismatch indicators would have showed a comfortable figure for the 
banks, the mismatch was located in borrowers’ balance sheets. 
13 By this transformation, we ensure that for every indicator a higher value implies a higher vulnerability 
measure. Even for the case of the liquidity risk indicator, as we compute it as the squared value of the 
liquidity ratio (a number between 0 and 1) minus 1.  
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Table 10: Hypothetical Projection for the Selected Risk Indicators 
 
Date #1 Date #2 Date #3 Date #4
Exposure to the public sector 18% 16% 7% 9%
Capital adequacy 12,0 11,2 11,0 10,9
Currency risk -236% -259% -118% 63%
Profitability -9% -8% 2% 3%
Liquidity risk 0,63 0,51 1,10 1,52  
 
For these projected indicators, we filter the values that enter in the problem or tranquil 
zones, depending on each indicator’s threshold. For those indicators in the problem 
zone, we calculate their squared value. As regards the liquidity indicator, we first 
subtract it by 1 and then elevate it, so as to make the squared values of the indicators 
nearer 0 greater than those closer to 1. For those indicators in the tranquil zone, we 
compute a zero value. The table that follows shows these calculations: 
 
Table 11: Intermediate Calculations  
 
 
Date #1 Date #2 Date #3 Date #4
Exposure to the public sector 0.03 0.03 0 0
Capital adequacy 144.00 125.44 121.00 118.81
Currency risk 5.57 6.71 0 0
Profitability 0.01 0.01 0 0
Liquidity risk 0.14 0.24 0 0  
 
Finally, we take the first period as the base for the index numbers, establishing them as 
100. Then, the vertical sum of the squared values defines the vulnerability index for each 
period as follows. 
 
Table 12: Vulnerability Index 
 
Date #1 Date #2 Date #3 Date #4
Exposure to the public sector 100 79,01 0 0
Capital adequacy 100 87,11 84,03 82,51
Currency risk 100 120,44 0 0
Profitability 100 79,01 0 0
Liquidity risk 100 175,38 0 0




The evolution of the early warning indicator (Figure 3) shows clearly how the 
vulnerability of the banking system was increasing prior to the crisis as well as the 
deterioration that can be observed in the various risk indicators. Following an initial 
period between 1997 and early 1999 when the index remained relatively flat and at low  
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levels, indicating that the banking system was by and large stable, the index started to 
increase steadily. 
 
Figure 3: Early Warning Indicator 
 
Vulnerability Indicator

























































































































The index shows that in 1997 and 1998 the Argentine banking system was stable and 
that the only source of vulnerability during this period was the liquidity risk to a very small 
degree. Although the aggregate index shows some increase in vulnerability in mid-1998, 
probably in response to the Russian crisis, it quickly returned to its previous levels. The 
upward trend starts in early 1999 and appears to coincide with the Brazilian devaluation. 
 
Looking at the components of the index (Figure 4), it seems that liquidity was already an 
issue in 1999 and that exposure to the public sector started to represent an increasing 
source of eventual weakness for Argentine banks.
14 The other components—currency 
risk, lack of profits, and capital adequacy—were deteriorating in a marginal way. 
 
The values of the vulnerability index for the years 2000 and 2001 were significantly 
higher than during previous years, with the index reaching its maximum value just before 
the beginning of the 2001 crisis. By that time, it was clear that all of the individual risk 
indicators had increased and the banking system was facing a significant degree of 
vulnerability. 
                                                  
14 For banks in some developing countries like Argentina, exposure to the public sector is usually seen as 
a source of vulnerability due to Argentina’s long history of fiscal imbalances. For other countries, this 
would not necessarily be the case.  
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Figure 4: Vulnerability Sources 
 
Vulnerability Sources

















This example illustrates the usefulness of the approach that has been used in this paper 
and its potential to serve as an early warning indicator of a banking crisis. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of caveats. First, the model requires a thorough understanding of 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities in order to understand the worst case 
scenarios. In the case of Argentina, the main risks during that period for the banking 
system were a maxi-depreciation of the currency, a large increase in the spreads on 
sovereign bonds (country risk), and a large recession. In addition, the liquidity risks were 
critical at the time because the banking system was highly dollarized and the central 
bank was limited in its ability to act as lender of last resort. In contrast, the current 
macroeconomic risks are different and some of the vulnerabilities of the banking system 
have also changed (e.g. because the banking system now operates in pesos). 
Therefore, we would need to adjust the worst-case scenarios and the model that 
captures the impact on banks to account for these differences. 
 
Second, the models are country specific and need to capture the interactions of the 
macroeconomic variables and the banking system. For instance, we argue in the case of 
Argentina that it is risky for banks to hold public sector bonds. This is true so far as the 
country has a low credit rating, but it would probably not be the case in EMCs that have 
investment grade ratings. In contrast, in other countries the problem could be the holding 
of long-term mortgages at fixed interest rates or a large concentration of loans in a 
specific sector (e.g., agriculture). As there is no one model that fits all banking systems, 
the modeling exercises proposed in this paper need to be tailored to specific situations. 
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Finally, the models are data intensive and require detailed information of the banks’ 
balance sheet and some critical indicators such as the interest rate and liquidity gaps, 
which are not always readily available from public information. 
 
 
6.  Peer Group Analysis for the Early Detection of Problematic 
Entities 
 
Problems in individual institutions, if not properly anticipated and managed, can trigger 
systemic problems. The general methodology suggested in the previous section 
provides a framework that can be adapted to analyze and evaluate banking systems as 
a whole or alternatively individual banks, even when each type of application would need 
its own refinements.  
 
When applied to individual banks, the general methodological idea remains the same. 
The process starts with projections of alternative macroeconomic or systemic scenarios, 
which are used to perform a stress test of the individual bank using its balance sheet, 
and then the model will provide the risk indicators as outputs on a forward-looking basis. 
 
This section seeks to provide a methodology using a number of risk indicators that can 
be used to evaluate when an individual bank distances itself from its peer group. The 
approach applies the same shocks to the balance sheet of each bank to assess whether 




Figure 5: Peer Group Analysis 
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Suppose that there are N banks in an economy and that a set of risk indicators is 
calculated for each of them for a given scenario. The set of risk indicators is the same as 
the ones calculated as outputs in the previous section. 
 
In order to compare the risk indicator set for each bank, we first calculate the average 
value for each indicator or variable for the overall system, or for the peer group of banks 
that we select, and then measure the distance for a given variable between the value of 
the individual bank and the systemic value. The model generates a vector (or 
multidimensional set) of k risk indicators, where k is the total number of indicators that 
are considered.  
 
The most natural distance measure would be that known as Euclidean distance.
15 To 
illustrate it, assume that the relevant set of risk indicators would have only two items—
ROA and a liquidity ratio (LIQ). If the peer group average for these two indicators were 
meanROA and meanLIQ, the Euclidean distance between bank i and its peer group 
would be calculated as: 
 
() ( )
2 2 meanROA LIQ meanROA ROA d i i i − + − =     (1) 
 
This calculation should help to detect the outlier banks in terms of risk indicators by 
comparing each bank’s indicators against the peer group averages. In real applications, 
the whole set of risk indicators would be used for the distance calculation. 
 
Graphing only the two indicators (LIQ and ROA) of the example, banks would be 
situated in the plane as in Figure 6. As can be seen, there are two banks (circled) that 
show huge negative profits in contrast to their peers and there is one bank showing a 


















                                                  
15 In this case, the distance between a bank and its peer group in terms of risk indicators would be 
calculated as the square root of the sum of the squares of the arithmetical differences between the 
value of its own risk indicators and the average value of the group’s risk indicators.  
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Figure 6: Two Indicators Example 
 






























Alternatively, a more appropriate distance measure would be a Mahalanobis distance.
16 
It differs from Euclidean distance in that it takes into account the correlations between 
the risk indicators and is scale-invariant. Thus, it is not dependent on the scale of 
measurements. Another improvement from Euclidean distance is that it weights each 
risk indicator inversely to their variance so that the noisier an indicator is the less 
important it will be for the determination of final location of the bank in terms of its peers. 
 
When this approach is applied, the full set of risk indicators would be used so the 
dimension of the distance measure would be equal to the quantity of them. Additionally, 
some other methodological issues should be considered. In particular, indicators should 
be normalized in order to ensure that there is a positive relationship between the 
variable and the level of risk. For example, the larger the ROA, the lower the risk. 
Alternatively, the larger the leverage, the larger the risk. Therefore, leverage indicators 
should be measured by their respective complement (capitalization indicators) so as to 
guarantee that all of the indicators maintain the same relationship sign with risk. 
 
Once the distance is calculated for each individual bank, it is possible to assess the 
frequency distribution of the calculated distances. The upper tail of the distribution will 
contain those banks that show greater distance from their peers and, therefore, these 
should be analyzed.  
 
                                                  
16 Mahalanobis, P. C. 1936). On the generalized distance in statistics. Proceedings of the National 
Institute of Sciences of India. Vol. 2 (1). pp. 49–55. Available at http://ir.isical.ac.in/ 
dspace/handle/1/1268.   
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There is another methodological issue to help in detecting the vulnerabilities facing those 
banks that show significant distance from their peers. The manner in which distances 
are calculated should allow for reverse engineering to enable detection of those risk 
factors that accounted for most of the distance.  
 
Coming back to the example using two risk indicators, it is a straightforward process to 
determine whether ROA or LIQ accounts for most of the total distance value. Generally, 
the same procedure can be done to produce a ranking of importance among risk factors 
to account for each bank distance indicator. 
 
While this methodology is well known in some fields, including marketing applications 
and anomaly detection for anti-money laundering practices, the interesting result in this 
application is the combination of this analysis with scenario-building and stress-testing 
methods to provide a forward-looking comparison among peer banks. Once again, a 
forward-looking approach can help in anticipating eventual problems and vulnerabilities 
within a macroprudential framework. 
 
 
7. Final  Reflections 
 
This paper has presented a methodology that attempts to construct a risk indicator for 
the early detection of vulnerabilities in the banking system. The first step is to identify the 
macroeconomic and systemic shocks that could affect the banking system or individual 
banks, especially their impact on solvency and liquidity.  
 
The methodology tries to capture the dynamic interactions between key macroeconomic 
variables and a set of parameters that affect the overall banking system, on one side, 
and the evolution of key risk indicators of the banking system, such as solvency and 
liquidity, on the other. The framework relies on a set of equations that summarizes the 
main elements of the balance sheet, the income statement of the banking system, and 
critical indicators such as the interest rate and currency and liquidity gaps. 
 
One distinctive feature of the methodology is that the scenarios are essentially forward-
looking in the sense that the shocks under consideration are not only based on historical 
data, but they also take into account the tail of the distribution. In other words, we 
consider events that have a low statistical probability of taking place based on historical 
data, yet these events could occur when the economy faces large macroeconomic 
imbalances or there is a systemic banking problem. In this sense, the methodology tries 
to capture episodes that are particularly traumatic for the banking system which could 
lead to systemic solvency or liquidity problems. 
  
The different scenarios that are considered in the paper can be built either by using 
expert judgment or through mathematical simulation regarding the evolution of the 
exogenous variables. These assumptions are then used to perform a dynamic simulation 
of the banking system and are summarized in a vulnerability index that can be used as 
an early warning indicator.  
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One of the distinctive features of our vulnerability index is that it combines traditional 
early-warning macroeconomic indicators with forward-looking, stress-testing techniques. 
The index integrates macroeconomic and bank performance indicators in a way that 
should help regulators to better understand the effects of macroeconomic shocks on a 
banking system. 
 
The model was calibrated for the Argentine banking system for the period 1997–2001, 
which covers an initial period of financial stability when the country’s banking system 
was in good shape and a second period that ended in a major banking crisis. The model 
performed well during this period and the vulnerability index was a useful early warning 
indicator of an impending Argentine banking crisis. In this regard, the Argentine 
application of the model shows the usefulness of the overall approach. At the same time, 
as we argued in section 5, the modeling exercise requires a thorough understanding of 
the macroeconomic vulnerabilities of the country under review as well as the specific 
characteristics of the banking system.  
 
This exercise illustrates the potential use of combining traditional early warning 
indicators with stress-testing techniques. While it is only a first step in this direction, we 
believe that this approach can be successfully used in other countries if significant 
efforts were made in each case to collect detailed banking sector data and understand 
the main institutional features and macroeconomic risks. 
 
Among the issues that need to be incorporated into the analytical framework are the 
overall safety net—especially the strength of the deposit insurance system and its ability 
to establish the confidence of small depositors—and the ability of the central bank to act 
as lender of last resort. In future exercises, we will try to incorporate the possible effects 
that these aspects have on the dynamic simulations. 
 
The dynamic framework that we use can help to evaluate the ability of a banking system 
to withstand an adverse shock. For instance, banks would have little ability to recover if 
there were a deterioration in the quality of their portfolios resulting from a large number 
of NPLs impairing their capital base. In contrast, the adverse effects of an increase in 
short- and long-term interest rates, which typically lead to a reduction in the value of 
long-duration assets and negatively affect banks’ net worth in the short-run, can be 
compensated for in the medium- to long-term as assets mature and the bank lends at 
higher rates of interest. In this respect, it is an advantage to use a multi-period model to 
track the evolution of profits, assets, and net worth to assess the ability of the banks to 
recover from certain shocks. 
 
The paper also develops an early warning indicator that is based on the performance of 
individual banks. This analytical framework uses cluster analysis and compares peer 
group financial institutions to detect those financial institutions, which based on a 
number of parameters, show risks or vulnerabilities that are different from the system as 
whole. As a result, this can serve as an early warning system for individual banks and 
help regulators to differentiate between individual and systemic problems. 
 
The dynamic simulations that were performed clearly illustrate that a well-designed 
regulatory framework aimed at reducing financial vulnerabilities needs to integrate  
50          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 44 
 
 
macroeconomic and microeconomic elements. While a banking system needs to have 
adequate capital and liquidity requirements to address potential credit problems and 
avoid a run on deposits, it is also necessary to incorporate into risk management 
practices an informed view about the evolution of key variables such as economic 
growth, interest rates, and the exchange rate. 
  




APPENDIX 1: Model Equations 
 
This appendix shows the equations behind the stylized banking system’s model. The 
approach here is similar to those of Drehman et. al. (2006), Kida (2008), and 
Mermelstein (2009). 
 
The starting point is the initial picture of assets and liabilities of the banking system 
under study, and we then proceed to assess its eventual performance over a 12 quarters 
time-window, when some changes or shocks in the scenario are made to happen. 
 
The model encompasses:  
 
t = 0 … T   periods 
 
with t=0 being the starting period, and t=1...T the simulation horizon. 
 
Additionally, the banking system’s balance-sheet model has: 
 
j= 0 … λ   maturity buckets 
 
which means that every assets or liability contemplated in the model matures in some 
period  j, and where j=0 means immediate liquidity. Finally, assets and liabilities are 
denominated either in domestic or in foreign currency so that there are 
 
c= 1, 2       currencies (1: domestic currency; 2: foreign currency) 
1. Assets 
 
Total assets of the banking system are defined as follows: 
 




: t A  Total assets in t 
: t M  Liquid non-interest earning assets in t 
: t TB  Assets held in the trading book in t 
: t BB Assets held in the banking book in t 
 
Interest earning assets, held either in the trading or in the banking book can be claims 
on private sector such as loans or on public sector such as public bonds. So that, there 
are two kinds of debtors: 
 
k= 1, 2      debtors (1: private sector; 2: public sector)  
52          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 44 
 
 
Assets held in the trading book are those that are marked-to-market period by period, so 
that they are registered at their present values, while those assets held in the banking 
book are registered by their face values. 
 
In the following paragraphs the valuation process of each asset type is detailed. 
 
1.1  Valuation of Assets Held in the Trading Book: 
 


















t t FV PV E TB
λ








t t FV PV  Present value in t  of assets maturing in j, denominated in currency c, 
against debtor k. 
 
Equation (2) shows how assets held in the trading book are marked to market. It 
indicates that TB is the sum across two debtor types (k), two currencies (c), and λ 
maturity buckets, of the properly discounted face value of assets, converted to domestic 
currency by multiplying by E where appropriate. 
 
The discounting process opens the possibility of capital gains (losses), as discounting 
factors vary period by period as market interest rates do, but coupon rates do not 
change until the assets mature. This shows the importance of the maturity structure of 
assets in terms of interest rate risk. 
 
Discount factors, interest and coupon rates, and default probabilities: 
 
















































q q R , 1 −  represents the equilibrium forward rate between q-1 and q, for risky assets 
denominated in currency c, implicit in the spot curve in t.  
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At the same time, arbitrage should ensure that for every period and maturity bucket the 
following equality holds: 
 
)] 1 ( ) 1 )[( 1 ( 1
c c c c c




















f r  Risk-free rate for assets denominated in currency c 
:
c PD  Probability of default for assets denominated in currency c 
:
c LGD  Loss-given-default rate for assets denominated in currency c 
 
Expression (5) shows that the return on any asset depends positively on the risk free 
interest rate and negatively on the probability of default and the loss given default. At this 
stage, 
c LGD is considered a fixed parameter, while default probabilities are determined 
by: 
 




t X PD PD =       ( 6 )  
 
where  β t X is a linear combination of a set of macroeconomic variables X and a vector 
of coefficients β. 
 
Additionally, assuming perfect capital mobility and the accomplishment of international 
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f r  the risk-free rate for domestic currency denominated assets, which depends 
positively on the international risk-free rate for foreign currency denominated assets 
*








=  of the domestic 
currency, and on the sovereign yield spread ρ. 
  
54          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 44 
 
 
On the other hand, foreign currency denominated assets earn  t f f ED r r − =
1 2  
 
Replacing equations (6) to (8) in (5) we have: 
 
) ), ( , , , (
* 1 1 LGD X PD ED r R R f β ρ =  ; Domestic currency denominated assets  (9) 
 
) ), ( , , (
* 2 2 LGD X PD r R R f β ρ = ; Foreign currency denominated assets   (10) 
 
with all the derivatives > 0. 
 
Additionally, interest rates charged on loans include a spread (α) that reflects 
administrative expenses. So that, for those assets held either in the trading book or in 












R     (11) 
  
In numerical simulations, it is assumed that α is equal to the ratio of administrative 
expenditures to assets.  
 
Now that we have introduced interest rates and discount factors, we can return to the 




Present value of assets held for trading: 
 
To show how to compute the sum in equation (2), we need to provide the formulae for 
the computation of present values of each asset type  : ) (
, j c
t t FV PV  
 
The next table illustrates the procedure, for bonds that coupon rate  0 C does not change: 
 
Maturity bucket  Present value 
j=1 
t t t t t FV D FV C D PV
1
0
1 + =  
j=2 





1 + + =  
j=3 












t t t t t t t t FV D FV C D FV C D FV C D PV
λ λ + + + + = 0 0
2
0
1 ...  
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Present values result from the sum of present values of interest payments 
t FV C0 discounted by the appropriate discount factors 
i
t D defined as in equation (4). 
 











t t FV D FV C D PV
1
0      ( 1 2 )  
 















t t FV D FV C D PV     (13) 
 
It is worth noting that in equation (13) we are keeping coupon rates constant at  0 C but in 
fact it is not the case for assets maturing before t. Thus, the last step we need to 
complete in order to calculate  t TB is to consider that coupon rates reset when assets 
mature in some period l < t. Taking this into account (and omitting the summation across 






It = 1   in period l when assets in bucket j repriced the last time prior to t. 
It = 0   otherwise 
 
The first double summation in (14) sums present values of those assets of which coupon 
rates have changed in some period l before t, while the second sums present values of 
those that keep paying  0 C at t. 
 
Additionally, coupon rates are determined in each period according to the prevailing term 
















so that Cl is the coupon rate that makes 100 the present value of a security, given the 
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1.2  Valuation of Assets Held in the Banking Book: 
 
As opposite to trading assets, assets held in the banking book are registered by their 

















t t FV E BB
λ






t FV  Face value in t of assets maturing in j, denominated in currency c, against 
debtor k. 
 
In this case, there is no discounting process involved. Assets are registered only at their 
face values, regardless of market interest rates movements. 
 
1.3  TB and BB Dynamics: 
 
Face values of those assets that are claims on the private sector (held either in the TB or 



























LGD PD FV FV  ;  when  k=1   (16) 
 
this means that assets are rolled over constantly, and their stocks only decrease due to 
write-offs and exchange rate movements for those denominated in foreign currency. 
Moreover, write-offs evolve according to equation (23). 
 
However, for those assets that represent claims on the public sector, an exogenous 
growth rate is assumed, so as to incorporate the possibility of compulsory bond 
issuances. It is quite usual that governments in developing countries rely excessively on 
banks when running fiscal imbalances. In that cases governments tend to crowd-out 
private assets within banks’ balance-sheets and the exposure to the public sector 
increases accordingly. Thus, for the case of claims on the public sector equation (16) 
becomes: 
 
() ) 1 ( 1
1
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−  ;  when  k=2  (16’) 
 
where  g is the exogenous growth rate of government bonds held by banks. For 
simulation purposes it is quite useful to link g to the growth rate of the public debt to 
GDP ratio as done in the numerical illustrations in section III. 
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1.4  Total Assets’ Value: 
 
The value of total assets in each period of time t can be obtained by replacing equation 
(3) and (14) in equation (1). The resulting expression and its partial derivatives are 
included in Appendix 2. The following table presents the signs of those derivatives. 
 
Variable  Derivative sign 
Nominal exchange rate  + (for foreign denominated holdings) 
Coupon rate  + 
Return rate  - 
Expected devaluation  - 
Country yield spread  - 
Default probability  - 
Loss given default rate  - 
 
 
As expected, increases in interest rates, expected devaluation, country risk, default 
probabilities and loss given default rates erodes asset values, while increases in coupon 
rates and nominal exchange rates increases registered asset values. 
 
2.   Liabilities 
 
Liabilities evolve according to exchange rate movements and to an exogenous growth 
rate t γ . This growth rate is included in the model in order to allow simulation of stress 
episodes that could impact deposits’ dynamics, such as bank runs as an extreme case. 





























,     (17) 
 
 
As liabilities are all registered at their face values, there are not capital gains due to 
shifts in interest rates. Interest rates movements only impact on interest income flows, 
but they do not produce stock impacts. 
 
It is assumed that banks do not pay interests on current account or savings deposits. 
Contrarily, time deposits accrue interests, but they are lower than those earned by 
assets of similar maturity. Specifically, it is supposed that time deposits accrue the 
international risk-free rate plus the expected devaluation for the case of those deposits 
denominated in domestic currency. However, it is assumed that deposit rates do not 
include any country risk premium. This is in line with what is observed in real markets 
and the stylized facts described by Maes (2005). 
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3.   Income Statements 
 
Net profit before taxes and dividends for period t is given as: 
 




: t Π  Net profit before taxes and dividends 
: t NIY  Net interest income 
: t WR  Write-offs 
: t OI  Non-interest net income 
: t Cost  Administrative expenditures 
: t NKG  Net capital gains 
 
 
Each component of the benefit equation is defined as follows: 
 
 
3.1  Net Interest Income: 
 
NYI is the difference between interest earnings on assets (CFA) and interest expenses 
on liabilities (CFL): 
 


















































It = 1   in period l when assets in bucket j repriced the last time prior to t. 
It = 0   otherwise 
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where FVL stands for “face value of liabilities”. Equations of CFA and CFL are just the 
summation of coupon earnings on assets and coupon expenses on liabilities, 
respectively. The presence of the indicator variable I is just to consider that coupon rates 
are fixed at their initial values for those assets (liabilities) that do not reprice in the 
current period, while the new coupon rates applies for those that repriced in some period 
l after t=0.  
 
 
3.2 Non-interest  Income: 
 
Non-interest margin is just assumed as a fixed share of interest margins according to: 
 





Write-offs on assets are given by the share of assets defaulting each period by the loss 
given default rate: 
 
t t t t LGD PD FV WR 1 − =       ( 2 3 )  
 
3.4 Administrative  Expenditures: 
 
Administrative expenditures are assumed as a constant share of total assets: 
 
1 − = t t A Cost η       ( 2 4 )  
 
3.5  Net Capital Gains: 
 
Net capital gains are produced by changes in interest rates that impacts on present 
values of those assets market-to-market, and by exchange rate movements affecting 
























































































FVL g BB TB
WR BB BB TB TB BB BB TB TB NKG
 (25) 
 
As equation (25) shows, net capital gains can be calculated as computing the total 
increase in trading and banking book values, then subtracting the exogenous increase in 












− + , the change in liabilities due to exchange rate  
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FVL , and finally adding the impact of movements in the 


















4. Banks’  Capital 
 
t t t K K Π + = −1     ( 2 6 )  
 
We assume no taxes and no dividend payouts. 
 
 
5.  Closing the Model 
 
Assets held in the trading and banking books have their own dynamics, as they evolve 
according to default and recovery rates, according to market value changes in the case 
of those held for trading, and because of exchange rate movements in the case of 
foreign denominated assets. Liabilities and capital have also their own dynamics.  
 
We close the model with  t M Δ , that is, cash and other similarly non-interest earning 
liquid assets. So that we have 
 
t t t t t BB TB L M Π + Δ − Δ − Δ = Δ     (27) 
 
6.  Risk Indicators for Prudential Monitoring 
 
The model developed in this section represents a comprehensive framework for financial 
risk simulation within a banking sector or an individual bank. In order to assess those 
risks, it is necessary to build some macroeconomic scenarios first so as to provide the 
model with the necessary inputs. The model is also useful to perform sensitivity analysis, 
which means the variation of individual parameters so as to measure its impact in terms 
of risk indicators. 
  
6.1   Inputs 
 
Once forward-looking scenarios are built, we should have a vector of inputs for each 
scenario. 
 
As described through its equations, our model works with the following inputs as stress 
forces: 
 
-  Maturity structure of assets 
-  Maturity structure of liabilities 
-  Term structure of interest rates  
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t X PD PD = ) 
-  Sovereign yield spread 
-  Spot exchange rate 
-  Future exchange rate (Expected devaluation) 
-  Bank efficiency parameters (Administrative expenses / Assets) 
 
 
6.2      Outputs 
 
6.2.1 Liquidity  Risk: 
 
a) Liquidity  Gaps 






t L A LG − =  







t t L A CLG
1 :  
 
b) Liquidity  Ratios 

















1 1 , where liquid assets (liabilities) those maturing not after 
t=L. 

















LRatio , where liquid assets (liabilities) those maturing not after 
t=L. 



















LRatio , where liquid assets (liabilities) those maturing not after 
t=L, and 




6.2.2  Interest Rate Risk: 
 










t t RSL RSA DGap   
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  This indicator is the difference between the dollar amount of interest-rate-
sensitive assets (RSA) and the dollar amount of interest-rate-sensitive liabilities 
(RSL). A positive (negative) dollar gap implies a long (short) position on interest 
rates, which means that a parallel increase on interest rates increases (reduces) 
net interest income where DGap is positive (negative). 
 










t t DurL W DurA DurGap  

















A positive (negative) DurGap indicates that parallel increases in interest rates 
would imply a decrease (increase) in the market value of the equity relative to 



















While dollar gap is a measure of interest flows sensitivity, duration gap is a 
measure of net worth sensitivity to movements in interest rates. 
 
6.2.3  Exchange Rate Risk: 
 
An indicator of currency mismatch in each period can be calculated as the ratio 
























6.2.4    Credit Risk: 
 
a) NPLs  Ratio 
 
The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total assets is the most typical 
indicator of quality of   credit portfolios. In this context, it depends on 
macroeconomic variables ( β t X ) through the probabilities of default, and it is 
roughly approximated by the ratio of the share of defaulted assets to total assets, 
as follows: 
  

























b)  Write-offs Ratio 


























c)  Exposure to the Public Sector 
 
This indicator is calculated as the ratio of claims on the public sector to total 
assets. As indicated, claims on the public sector are assumed to growth in 


























6.2.5   Profitability: 
 


























NIYratio =   
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d) Implicit  Spread 
Calculated as the difference between the implicit interest rate earned on assets, 











i i SPREAD − = − =  
 






NKGratio =  
 
6.2.6    Solvency: 
 
a) Capital 
It summarizes the evolution of assets and liabilities over time, and it is calculated 
as  








Leverage =  
 
























where the denominator are the risk-weighted assets, calculated according to the 
appropriate risk weights 
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1. Implementation  Issues: 
 
As this application tends to be just illustrative, some implementation issues were treated 
simplistically. 
 
In this regard, default probabilities were related negatively with GDP growth rates period 
by period by the following econometric equation estimated from Argentine banks’ data: 
 
))) ln(PD GDPgrowth * 1,17057625 - 477286 exp(-(0,03 + 1
1
1 - t t +
= t PD  
 
Default probabilities were also increasingly escalated according to maturities, by a rate 
of 0.025 per quarter. 
 
Interest rates on deposits were inversely related with the ratio liquid assets to liquid 
liabilities, with the ratio of capital to RWA and with the parameter that reflect the 
perceived level of safety net within the banking system, and were related with the 
currency mismatch ratio and the exposure of banks to the public sector in a direct way. 
 
All this issues would need a more detailed and specific treatment, according to each real 
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